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PREFACE 
This present work germinated in an attempt to study Kant's doctrine 
of causality_ A parenthetical remark regarding our interpretation of 
Kant's doctrine on transcendental object became necessary. However, we 
found that a mere parenthesis would not be adequate in the face of all 
the conflicting opinions regarding this doctrine. A thorough examination 
of Kant's authentic position became necessary. 
This thesis is the result. We found the extensive efforts required 
in this undertaking to be totally justified. A proper understanding of 
Kant's authentic doctrine of transcendental object is essential to under-
stand properly not only his doctrine on causality, but also his doctrine 
on the very nature of critical philosophy. 
We will begin (Chapter I) by examining the interpretations of this 
doctrine by some of the more prominent historians of and commentators on 
Kant. The remainder of this thesis will then test an interpretation of 
transcendental object as a critically mature doctrine by the text of The 
Critique ~~ Reason. We will seek to discover whether Kant's trans-
cendental object is a consistent and critically mature doctrine throughout 
the Critique in terms of the following questions. ~) Is it a thing-in-
itself? (Chapter II §A). (2) Is it a mere appearance? If not, is it a 
third something between the realm of things-in-themselves and ~ 
iv 
vr 
appearances? (Chapter II §B). (3) What does the transcendental objeot 
have to do with totality and the nature of synthetic knowledge? In what 
does the transcendental object's unknowability consist? (Chapter II §C 
& D). (4) Is transcendental object involved with the world of appearances 
in some way even though it remains an unknown or " .. X"? (Cha.pter II §E). 
5) What does transoendental objeot have to do with the transcendental 
unity of apperception? What is its role in the grounding of our know-
ledge of objects -- is it necessary for this grounding? What role does 
the transcendental object play in the Transcendental Deduction of the 
categories? (Chapter III). (6) What is the role of the transcendental 
objeot in Kant's resolution of pure reason's natural conflict with 
itself? (Chapter IV). 
We feel that the answers to these questions will be of great help 
to understand better not only transcendental object, but also the true 
nature of Kant's system of oritical philosophyo 
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CHAPTER I 
A SUMMARY OF THE INTERPRETATIONS OF TRANSCENDENTAL 
OBJECT BY SOME OF THE MORE PROMINENT 
COMMENTATORS AND HISTORIANS 
Interpretations regarding Kant's transcendental objeot fall into 
three basic categoriesl (a) transcendental object means the same as 
thing-in-itself, (b) transcendental object is a purely subjective element 
in the knowing process and is distinct from thing-in-itself, (c) trans-
cendental object is merely some kind of correlate of subjectivity and is 
distinct from thing-in-itself. In addition to these three general cate-
gories we will discuss (d) a unique interpretation by de Vleeschauwer 
and finally (e) a unique interpretation by M. Wartenberg. The latter 
will serve as a point of departure for the interpretation this thesis 
intends to test. 
A. Transcendental Object Interpreted as 
Identical with Thing-in-Itself 
This first general category of commentators and historians is by 
far the largest in number. Many of this first category indicate no tensio 
whatsoever in identifying transcendental object and thing-in-itself at 
all times in the Critique. Others so identify them after some explicit 
and critical questioning or examination of their identity. In the latter 
1 
2 
group are included some who do not explicitly discuss transcendental 
object but do imply that it is identical with thing-in-itself. 
Several of this first major category of interpreters state that 
transcendental object means thing-in-itself in some passages while in 
other passages it does not. 
There is a final group in this first general category who state 
that transcendental object is distinguished from noumenon in some way 
by Kant's express words, but are explicitly or implicitly forced into 
denying that transcendental object is really distinct from thing-in-
itself. 
1 2 3 Friederick Paulsen, August Messer , H. W. Cassirer , B. 
Fuller and S. M. Mc Murrin4, and Eduard Zuermann5 all without 
A. G. 
question-
ing identify transcendental object with thing-in-itself. Kuno Fischer 
says that "Since all phenomena are empirical objects, the thing-in-itself 
is called in distinction therefrom 'the transcendental object •• ,,6 
1Friederick Paulsen, Immanuel Kantl 
Scribners, 1902), pp. 155, 250. 
His Life and Doctrine (New York: 
-------
2August Messer, Kommentar zu Kants Kritik dar reinen Vernunft 
(Stuttgart I Strecker und Schroder; 1922), pp. 5r;-132, 1340 Of. A. 
Messer, "Die IBeziehung auf den Gegenstand' bei Kant," Kantstudien, VIII, 
321-28. 
3H• W. Cassirer, Kant's First Critique (New York: MacMillan, 1954), 
p. 288. 
4B• A. G. Fuller, revised by Mc Murrin, ! History £! Philosophy 
(3rd ed.; New York: Holt, 1955), p. 241. 
5 
Eduard Zuerman, "Die transcendentale Deduktion der Kategorien in 
Kants 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft'," Kantstudien, V, no. 4, pp. 444-70, 
esp. p. 454. 
3 
Heinrich Lanz identifies pure objectivity with the thing-in-itself, and 
thus finds that the transcendental object is "the pure form of objectiv-
ity since it is entirely empty of intuition and rests solely on pure 
thought in so far as it is a 'transcendental object', as an object lin 
itself' (Ding an sich) .,,7 Etienne Gilson equates "x", or unknown, with 
thing-in-itself; therefore, he appears to indicate implicitly that the 
"transcendental object a x" is identical with thing in itself even 
. 8 though he does not explicitly discuss the term transcendental obJect. 
Heading those who identify transcendental object with thing-in-itself 
after a critical and explicit questioning is Norman Kemp Smith. He finds 
transoendental object to be an immature element in Kant's doctrines 
a precritical belief that the existence of a noumenal self was proved in 
the Paralogisms. Smith finds that transcendental object as it is employ-
ed in the Critique is the key to many inconsistencies and artificial 
connections in the Critique. 9 L. Busse also examines the interpretation 
6Kuno Fischer, ! Critique of Kant, ire from the German by W. S. 
Hough (London, Lowrey & Co., 1888J7:Pp. 28-9. 
7Heinrich Lanz, "Das Problem der Gegenstandlichkeit in der modernen 
Logik," Kantstudien, No. 26, (1912), p. 19; cf. also pp. 16, 17,28. 
8E• Gilson, Being ~ ~ Philosophers (Second ed.; Toronto, 
PontifiCal Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), pp. 130-131. 
9N• K. Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique ££ ~ Reason (Londona 
Macmillan, 19~3), pp. 406-7,214-15,412,327-31,457. 
that thing-in-itself, noumenon, and transcendental object are all 
identical with one another and concludes that this interpretation is 
10 
oorrect 0 
4 
E. Caird views the transcendental object as a goal to be accomplish-
ed and identical with noumenon or thing-in-itself; therefore, we include 
him in this first general category even though he speaks of transcenden-
tal object as a correlate of subjecto He says, "The transcendental 
11 
object is the correlate of transcendental subject." The unity of all 
perceptions connected together in the consciousness of one world "is 
the necessary correlate of the consciousness of the self in apprehending 
12 
that world." The continuous synthesis of experience is guided by an 
unr~izable absolute whole of things existing independently of the sub-
h · . i 1 13 ject as a noumenon or t 1ng-1n- tse f. All objects of experience are 
refered to a transcendental object. The consciousness of transcendental 
object correlates with the consciousness of self. The transcendental 
object is "the noumenon to which we refer them L~bjects of experienc!7' 
14 
••• not itself an object of knowledge, but only an idea." 
10 L. Busse, "Zu Kants Lehre vom Ding an sich," Zeitschrift fur 
Philosophie, CII, 1, pp. 14-113. 
11 E• Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (2nd ed.; 
Glasgow: Maclehos;:-1929) I, p. 546, note no. 1. 
12Ibid~ I, 321. 13Ibid. I, 291-940 
- -
14Ibid • II, 140. Caird also considers totality of appearances 
to be a noumenal conception; cf. Ibid. r., 154 ff, and II, 586. 
5 
v. Cousin does not discuss transcendental object in explicit 
terms, but he talks of the "I think" as a representation of a "transcen-
dental subject D x"o Furthermore his discussion of the antinomies 
certainly implies that there is no distinction between object in itself 
15 (transcendental object) and thing-in-itself. 
James Collins and John E. Smith do not explicitly discuss transcen-
dental object, but it is implied in their discussion of Kant that trans-
cendental object means simply thing-in-itself. Collins states that 
sensation becomes an objeot of knowledge when it is endowed with unity 
and neoessitx by being brought within the field of the unifying relation 
to the transcendental unity of apperception, the ultimate ground of 
synthesizing the manifold into a unity of meaning. 16 Collins makes a 
number of statements about objeots which indicate quite clearly that 
he assumes an unknown, or "x", is noumenal,1 7 that a total series of 
conditions is simply noumenal. Collin's statements seem to imply that 
15v. Cousin, ~ Philosophy of ~, translated by A. G. Henderson 
(Londona Chapman, 1854), pp. 93, 111 ffo 
16James Collins, ! History ££ Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee: 
Bruce, 1954), p. 484. This is an adequate explanation of the unity of 
an object, but it does not explain adequately Kant's grounding of the 
necessity of an objeot. It seems to leave Kant utterly helpless against 
Hume's skepticism and the charge of pure subjectivism. We will discuss 
this point in Chapter:IU:,esp. pp. 5'-51. 
17 
"In its own act of being, the thing remains an unknown X." ~. 
p. 489. 
18 
transcendental object means thing-in-itself. 
John E. Smith also relegates any totality of phenomena (such as 
"the world ll ) to the realm of noumenal entities by implying that it 
would have to be the object of an intellectual intuition and is for 
this reason unknown. 19 His argument implies that transcendental object 
is identical with thing-in-itself at all times in the Critique even 
though he does not explicitly discuss "transcendental object". 
Rudolph Lehmann, A. C. Ewing, G. A. Schrader, and H. Herring all 
explicitly stDte that Kant sometimes means thing-in-itself by trans-
cendental object and at other times does not. Lehmann recognizes a 
general tendency to identify transcendental object with thing-in-itself 
but st",tes that even though it does mean thing-in-itself throughout 
The Dialectic, it means a fully subjective univocal form of object in 
20 
general elsewhere. Ewing explicitly disagrees with Norman K. Smith, 
stating that the meaning of transcendental object is deliberately 
changed by Kant at A104-110, even though he agrees that it does mean 
thing-in-itself in numerous other pass~bes of the Critigue. Ewing states 
18"Rationalists err in applying directly to appearances the noumenal 
principle about a total aeries of conditions." Ibid., p. 498. We will 
discuss totality and the idea of totality in the antinomies later in 
this thesis and show that this quite possibly is not a noumenal element. 
19John E. Smith, "The question of man," in The Philosophy of Kant 
~ .2E.!. Modern Vlorld, ed by C. W. Hendel, (NeVI York. Liberal Arts~ 
ppo 10, 14-150 We will discuss totality of phenomena as an object of 
possible experience, and thus related to sensation and not a noumenal 
entity later in Chapter II D of this thesis. 
20Rudolph Lehmann, Kants Lehre ~ Ding ~ sich LInaugural Disser-
tation - Gottingen] (Berlin: J. Sittenfeld, 187B); pp. 44-49. 
that at A104-110 Kant is pointing out 
••• thai for us the reference to an object cannot mean more 
that Lthe facil that the representations constitute a 
system. For he is saying, our concept of the transcen-
dental object considered apart from2lhis does become the 
empty concept of a thing-in-itself. 
Sohrader explioitly says that transcendental object sometimes means 
7 
thing-in-itself and sometimes means an a priori object in general which 
22 Kant tended to drop in the Seoond Edition. H. Herring states that 
transcendental object has & wider meaning in which it is "kein Gegenstand 
einer moglichen Vorstellug" and a narrower meaning "als transzendenter 
Gegenstand, a18 Ding an Sich"; in the latter sense it is the ground of 
all affection. 23 
Hans Vaihinger also seems to identify transcendental object and 
thing-in-itself at times and at other times gi~e it another meaning. 
At least three times in his commentary he seems to identify them with 
t t i 24 B t H' . t t 25 V . h' t no apparen ens on. u as err~ng po~n s ou, a~ ~nger seems 0 
consider the transcendental object as an object of experience and, on 
21 A• C. Ewing, ! Short Commentary ~ Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 
(London: 1938), p. 101; cf. the entire passage pp. 99-102. 
22G. A. Sohrader, "The Thing in Itself in Kantian Philosophy," 
~ Review of Metaphysios, II (1949), pp. 30-44; see esp. pp. 31-33. 
23H. Herring, ~ Problem ~ Affektation ~ ~ (Cologne: 1953), 
}Cant studien no. 61l. pp. 84-85. 
24Hans Vaihinger, Kommentar ~ Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
(Stuttgart: W. Speman, 1881-1892), II, pp. 16, 36, 37. 
25 Herring,~. cit., p. 82. 
the other hand, the thing-in-itself as no object of possible experience 
26 
but rather the fundamental transcendent object. Vaihinger1s view is 
complicated by the fact that he later decides that in the Opus Postumum 
Kant was aware that the thing-in-itself is a fiction and that any dis-
tinction in reality between phenomenon and noumenon is merely a point 
27 
of view towards the object. 
Finally we find that F. C. Coppleston and Hans Cohen feel that 
Kant explicitly distinguishes between transcendental object and noumenon 
in some way, but that transcendental object is not really distinct from 
thing-in-itself. Coppleston says that Kant distinguishes between trans-
cendental object and noumenon in the First Edition. 28 He says that we 
arrive at what Kant means by transcendental object by abstracting from 
all in the object which has reference to the conditions of knowledge. 
Thus we arrive at a completely indeterminate unknown "x" in general, 
i.e., transcendental object. This, says Coppleston, is not yet the idea 
of a noumenon for Kant; it is merely a limiting concept and does not 
assume intellectual intuition as noumenon does. Coppleston says that at 
A253 Kant indicates that noumenon is something more than transcendantal 
26Vaihinger, op. cit., II, 6 ff. 
27Hans Vaihinger, .'!h!. Philosophy .2.! ".!!. l!.", Translated by C. K. 
Ogden (New York. Harcourt Brace & Co., 1925), pp. 313-18; see also p. 76. 
28 F. C. Coppleston, S.J., ~. History of Philosophy (Westminster, 
Md •• 1960)~ VI, 2680 
9 
objeot but then proceeds to eliminate that something more "to give an 
interpretation of noumenon which seems to differ not at all from his 
. 29 interpretation of the transcendental obJect." Coppleston then says 
that Kant clears up this confusion in the Second Edition by carefully 
distinguishing between the two senses of noumenon and disregarding the 
30 
use of the positive sense. This noumenon, this thing-in-itself, this 
thought-~n~-something, is then merely a limiting concept. 31 For 
Coppleston, then, the transcendental object is in fact the noumenon in 
the negative sense, and thus is the thing-in-itself considered in so 
far as it is not an object of our intuition. 
Hans Cohen also indicates transcendental object is not noumenon in 
the positive sense, but rather a something in general, and that this 
is what Kant means by saying that transcendental object "kann nicht 
Noumenon heissen" at A253. 32 This is to say that it is noumenon in the 
negative sense, and thus, is thing-in-itself. Although Cohen does 
indicate that the idea of transcendental object is the idea of something 
in general as a non-empirical object serving as the unknown ground of 
29Ibid~ p. 269; cf. p. 268. 
30At B301 (268) Kant defines noumenon in the negative sense as 
"a thing so far as it is !!£i 2 object of .2E sensible intuition, and 
so abstract from our mode of intuiting it." He defines noumenon in the 
posl,tive sense as "an object of a non-sensible intuition ••• LPresu!;pos-
i~ a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual." 
31 Ibi~ pp. 269-10. 
32H• Cohen, Kommentar zu Kants Kritik ~ reinen Vernunft (Leipzigl 
1901), p. 101. 
10 
appearances and that transcendental means something other than trans-
3J 
cendent in Kant, he does not eliminate the identity of transcendental 
object and noumenon in the negative sense, and thus, does not eliminate 
the identity of transcendental object and thing-in-itself in so far as 
it is not an object of our intuition. 
T. D. Weldon also feels that Kant attempts to make some distinction 
between transcendental objeot and noumenon. He differs, however, from 
Coppleston and Cohen in that he says Kant does so in talking about 
thing-in-itself as distinct from noumenon. Weldon says that Kant thus 
slips into the unfortunate habit of calling the thing-1ll-itself trans-
~ cendental object in this context.34 Therefore, Weldon identifies thing-
in-itself with transcendental objeot. He explicitly states that thing-
in-itself, or noumenon, or transcendental object form one group of 
entities, and phenomena anothero'5 
B. Transcendental Object Interpreted as a Purely 
Subjective Element in the Knowing Process 
And Distinct from the Thing-In-Itself 
Ernst Marcus points out that Kant does not seem to identify trans-
cendental object with thing-in-itself but rather seems to say that it 
is merely a synthetic function of the transcendental unity of appercep-
33~., pp. 66, cf. pp. 107, 132, 142, 154, 155, 168, 177. 
34T• D. Weldon, Introduction to Kant's Critique of ~ Reason 
(Oxford: 1945), p. 193. Cf. pp. 56, 171, 293-294-
35Ibido, p. 920 
11 
36 tion. However, Marcus also talks of a critical thing-in-itself in 
Kant as the ground of appearances and the totality of appearances. 37 
In this kind of statement he sounds a great deal like de Vleeschauwer, 
whom we will discuss later, and he seems to open the possibility that 
transcendental object could be identified with this critical thing-in-
itself. 
H. J. Paton also points out (1) that Kant distinb~ishes between 
transcendental object and thing-in-itself, and (2) that the transcenden-
tal object is a subjective element in our thought -- the unity which 
we think into appearances. 38 However, Paton's position is complicated 
by the fact that he distinguishes statements in which Kant talks about 
the transcendental object as an unknown "x" and statements in which he 
39 
talks about it in so far as it can be known. Paton implies that as 
an unknown "x" it is really the transcendent thing-in-itself.40 Paton's 
position is further complicated in that he feels that the thing-in-
itself is not necessary to the Analytio in any way; however, he also 
36Ernst Marcus, Aus den Tlefen des Erkennensl Kants Lehre von der 
Apperzeption (dem Selb;tb;;';sstsein) der Kategorialverbindung und den 
Verstandesgrundsatzen (MUnchen: Reinhardt, 1925), pp. 114-115. 
37Ernst Marcus, Logik, ~ Elementarlehre ~ Allgemeinen und ~ 
Grundztige der transcendentalen Logik, line EinfUhrung 1a Kants Kategori-
enlehre (Herford: W. Menckhoff, 1911), pp. 233-40. 
38H. J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysics .2!. Experience: ! Commentary .2.!! 
the First Half of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2 vols.; 2nd ed.; 
London I 1~,-r,~1. Cf. r;-424; II, 443-440 
39~., II, 448. 40Ibid., I, 424-25, 436. 
12 
recognizes that there is a great deal of difficulty involved in ground-
ing objectivity merely upon the transcendental unity of apperception 
which he interprets as a purely subjective element.41 
Hirschberger also finds the transcendental object to be purely 
subjective and distinct from thing-in-itselfz 
IGegenstande l werden von ihm Lianii nicht mehr vorgefunden, 
sondern vom Subjekt gesetzt, durch seine Ikonstitutiven l 
Denkforrnen. Gegenstande sind nicht mehr transzendent, 
sondern nur transzendental.42 
Hirschberger also feels that the unity of apperception must have object-
ive validity, because every transcendental synthesis must, and that 
Kantian objectivity rests on the lawfulness of the subjective categor-
ies.43 Thus Hirschberger is forced to criticize Kant for assuming what 
44 he set out to prove in the Transcendental Deduction, and further, to 
doubt whether any genuine objects are possible in Kant IS system since 
the mind is really not brought into contact with anything other than 
itself.45 
Graham Eird states that the notion of a transcendental object is 
not the notion of a noumenon, not the idea of an intelligible object, 
4 1Ibid., pp. 518-21. Cf. H. J. Paton, liLa deduction transcenden-
tale dans lloeuvre de Kant, by H. J. de Vleeschauwer" (a review), ~ 
47z 233-40, esp. pp. 234-235 and p. 239. Paton's difficulty regarding 
the grounding of objectivity is very well taken since, after he considers 
transcendental object a mere subjective element. He thus has nowhere 
to go in order to ground objectivity, espeoially since he eliminates 
thing-in-itself completely as a possibility of doing so. 
42Johannes Hirschberger, Geschichte ~ Philosophie (Zweite Auflage; 
E'reiburg im Breisgaul Herder & Co., 1955), II, 269. 
44Ibid. 45 Ibid ., p. 302. 
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but "only the idea of certain objective features of our knowledge and 
46 
experience. 1I Furthermore, in the Deduction it is merely a "cipher 
for expressing a philosophic task yet to be completed", not "a solution 
to Kant's problem about the meaning of the term object ••• by relating 
our sensations to an imperceptible object beyond them".47 On the other 
hand, he also says the appearances represent transcendental object, not 
things-in-themselves, but he does not develop the thought of this state-
mento48 
c. Transcendental Object Interpreted as a Correlate of 
Subjectivity and Distinct from Thing-in-Itself 
E. Adickeu explicitly states that transcendental object is another 
expression for transcendental apperception at A104-110, but also points 
out that it means a oorrelate of transcendental apperception in the 
Transcendental Deduction and at A250-251. He makes it clear that trans-
cendental object is not in the realm of transcendent things-in-themsel-
ves, but is rath~r an undetermined idea of object in general--a repre-
sentation of appearances. Thus, as an idea of objectivity, it cannot 
be thought in total isolation from sense data, whereas the thing-in-
itself can be. However, Adickes feels the expression "transcendental 
46Graham_Bird, Kant's Theory of KnOWle~ (London. Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, LNew Yorka The Humanities Pres~ 1962), pp. 79-80. 
47 Ibid ., p. 79. 
48Ibid ., pp. 4-5,17. 
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object" was dropped in the Seoond Edition since it was foreign to Kant's 
train of thought and unnecessarily complicated the discussion in the 
First Edition, making the First Edition too difficult to understand.49 
For Richard Kroner the totality of objects of nature in itself 
(transcendental object) is merely in the realm of appearances and exists 
only ~ ~ (not in itself) as a correlate to man, the subject of object-
ive knowledge0 50 However, Kroner does hold that, 1ll respect 1£ their 
supreme conditions, the objectivity of objects and the subjectivity of 
51 
knowledge are identical. 
Bruno Bauch also considers transcendental object to be a correlate 
of the subject. For him it is not a thing-in-itself, but rather an idea 
which does have some real relation to thing-in-itself. He says the 
transcendental object is nothing other than a rule of unity in itself, 
not a really given thing, but a unity given through an idea to appear-
ances- -some unity of the manifold over and against apperception as a 
correlate of the unity of apperception. 52 
49E• Adickes, !!ni und ~ Ding !ll ~ (Berlinl 1924), pp. 97-112. 
50 . R1chard Kroner, Kant's Weltanschauung, Translated by John E. 
Smith (University of Chicago, 1956), pp. 86, 96-970 
51~., p. 75. Kroner's remark here reI A157=B197, where we feel 
Kant is referring to what he called transcendental object in the First 
Edition, i.e., a third something, is similar to our later discussion 
in Chapter III of the possibility that the objectively necessary trans-
cendental unity of apperception may be composed of two aspects, the 
transcenden·tal object on the one hand, and the original and necessary 
consciousness of the identity of the self on the other hand, at A108. 
II 52Bruno B~uchl Geschichwder Philosophie (Berlin: 1921), VII 
I~Immanuel Kant}, 2~3-~4o ---
15 
Bauch eng'ages in a discussion of the transcendental unity of apper-
ception as the ground of objectivity but has difficulty grounding the 
necessity of Objects. 53 Later he points out that knowledge is knowledge 
of appearances whose objects are not absolute, but also points out his 
conviction that objectivity must be secured independently of subjectivity. 
Bauch further states that noumenon differs from transcendental object in 
that the former has only a negative use whereas the latter has a positive 
Use as a "something D x", as an object in general correlative to the 
unity of apperception and through which appearances have unity. As such 
transcendental object is not a real object, but rather a logical function. 
But the fact that the transcendental object is one and the same for all 
appearances reveals the significance of thing-in-itself as the determin-
ing ground of the manifold syntheses} the thing-in-itself is the indi-
viduality of transcendental object just as the transcendental object 
is the universality of the thing in itself. Thus the transcendental 
object as a correlate of subjectivity grounds the unity of objects and 
is distinct from things-in-themselves which specify appearances as 
54 individuals. Ultimately Bauch rests the independence of the giveness 
of objects for Kant on the thing-in-itself. 55 
53 Ib 'd --1-. , p. 2250 54~., pp. 261-266. 
55Ibid., p. 268. We must ob,erve that Bauch is preparing to move 
into the practical works and thus may have a tendency to allow more 
reality to the thing-in-itself than Kant would allow in the speculative 
work. R. Adamson, who engages in no discussion of transcendental object, 
also holds that the real thing-in-itself is certainly the ground of the 
phenomenal world; as such it remains an unknown. Cf. R. Adamson. 
On the Philosophy .2.t ~ (Edinburgh. D. Douglas, 1879), pp. 78, 216. 
16 
It is convenient to mention Hans Cornelius here even though he 
does not fit neatly into any of our general categories. He is similar 
to Bauch in so far as he holds that there is some real connection be-
tween transcendental object and thing-in-itself. Cornelius holds that 
the transcendental object is immanent, thus distinct from the transcen-
56 dent thing-in-itself, but also holds that object is noumenon which is 
not totally separated by an impassable chasm from phenomenon. The 
noumenon contains phenomenon as regards the necessity in phenomenon. 57 
He also states that the transcendental object is thought through the 
understanding as an alleged object of sensible intuition which is not 
a pure unknown but is known to a great extent as a condition we must 
58 prescribe to things in our scientific knowledge of them. He further 
says that transcendental object is for Kant a totality concept which 
has something about it which corresponds to the receptivity of sensibil-
ity and that transcendental object is, therefore, clearly shown to be 
of a natural origin. 59 
D. H. J. de Vleeschauwer's Interpretation 
H. J. de Vleeschauwer's interpretation of transcendental object 
deserves special treatment here because it is closely associated with 
his conviction that Kant ultimately makes the thing-in-itself an immanent, 
56H• Cornelius, Kommentar ~ Kritik ~ reinen Vernunft (Erlangenl 
1926), pp. 17-18 0 
57 Ibid ., pp. 104-5. 58 I£i!., pp. 105-106. 
not transcendent, entity. Thus this interpretation does not fit neatly 
into our three general categories. 
De Vleeschauwer states that Kant minutely and carefully developed 
the transcendental object in the First Edition Deduction as something 
like a noumenon, and in more than the negative sense, since it occupied 
a positive role in the transcendental structure. However Kant omits 
this interpretation in the reorganization of the Second Edition Deduction 
in order to avoid the confusion between transcendental object and trans-
cendental apperception in his more lucid presentation of the doctrine 
60 
of apperception. 
De Vleeschauwer states that in both editions of tpe Critique the 
ultimate ground of objectivity is the unity of apperception, explicitly 
disagreeing with the position that the object as such is th8 fundamental 
ground of the necessary unity of consciousness. De Vleeschauwer further 
states that the function Kant had attributed to transcendental object 
in the First Edition Kant attributes to the synthetic unity of conscious-
ness in the Second Edition; there is no difference in doctrine in the 
two editions. The transcendental object of the First Edition is merely 
the formal unity of an object in general; nevertheless, in all cases 
the unity of apperception is the foundation of Objectivity.61 
De Vleeschauwer's position regarding Kant's Opus postumum is inti-
60 . H. J. de Vleeschauwer, La Deduct10n transcendentale dans ~oeuvre 
~ ~ (3 vols.; ParisI Leroux, 1934-31), II, 294-98, 511-88; III, 36. 
61~., III, 124-125. 
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mately bound up with his interpretation of the transcendental object 
and thing-in-itself. He believes that the transcendental function of 
the III think" eventually replaces the operation of transcendental object, 
which had oscillated in meaning between transcendent thing-in-itself 
and transcendental apperception in the Critigue. But in the Opus 
Postumum the thing-in-itself is no longer transcendent, but is rather 
62 
a pure representation of actuality proper to the subject. He says 
Kant again takes up the transcendental object, which he had dropped in 
1781, in the Opus Postumum in order to consolidate his idealism. Here 
the transcendental object is identical with the unity of apperception 
as it is objectivized in its constitution of the world in experience. 
This objectivized unity of apperception is nothing other than the thing-
in-itself in so far as it is a pure representation of actuality proper 
to the subject. Thus transcendental object and thing-in-itself are 
identical as an immanent concept of an object in general, the universal 
63 
form of an object in general. The scope of this thesis does not al-
low a critical examination of whether thing-in-itself is immanent or 
transcendent. We assume that thing-in-itself is transcendent in the 
Critique. Thus we have no direct comments to make regarding de Vle-
eschauwer's interpretation in the remainder of this thesis. 
62 Ibid ., III, 124-125. 
63 Ibid ., III, 621, 639-40, 643, 645. 
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E. M. Wartenberg's Interpretation: the Point of De-
parture for a Possible new and More Exact 
Approach to Transcendental Object in 
the Criti~ue of Pure Beason 
19 
M. Wartenberg carefully states that for the transcendental idealist 
there is a distinction between the transcendent thing-in-itself (noumen-
~), i.e., object of intellectual intuition, and the world of appearances 
The tran~cendental object is therefore an undetermined something which 
is called "transcendental objectl1 to distinguish it from thing-in-itself 
on the one hand, and from the empirical object or objeot of knowledge 
proper, on the other hand. It is a form of objectivity in general with 
no content. It is given expression in a pure idea of the understanding. 
Nevertheless, Wartenberg maintains that the representation of the trans-
cendental object is a representation of appearances in some way. Fur-
thermore, Wartenberg states that objects of experience are grounded in 
64 
the transcendental object for the transcendental idealist. 
Wartenberg's position can be recast in such a way that gives the 
following tentative interpretation of transcendental object corresponding 
closely to our table of contents for chapters II and III of this thesis: 
Chapter II 
A. Transcendental object is distinguished from both 
phenomenon and noumenon. 
B. Transcendental object is in fact a third something. 
Co Transcendental object is the form of objectivity in 65 
general and is thus involved with a totality of objects. 
64M• Wartenberg, "Der Begriff des 'transcendentalen Gegenstandes' 
[bei Kant und Schopenhauers Kritik desselben; eine Bechtfertigung Kants," 
Kantstudie~ V (1900-01), 145-16. See esp. 163, 165, 166, 168-10. 
D. Transcendental objeot is represented in a non-
oontentual idea and thus is an unknown. 
20 
E. Transoendental object is a representation of appear-
ances and thus is involved with the world of appear-
ances, not with the realm of things in themselves. 
Chapter III 
Objects of experience are grounded in the transcendental 
objeot for the transcendental idealist, therefore, we must 
examine the function of transcendental object in the 
Transcendental Deduction. 
In summary, in this chapter we have seen three major categories of 
interpretation of transcendental object: (a) that it is in some way 
equivalent to thing-in-itself or noumenon, (b) that it is a purely sub-
jective entity and is distinct from thing-in-itself, (c) that it is 
some kind of correlate of subjectivity and yet is distinct from thing-
in-itself. In addition to these three we examined (d) a position which 
basically identifies transcendental object with thing-in-itself, but 
ultimately interprets thing-in-itself as an immanent, not transcendent, 
entity. Finally we examined (e) the unique position of Wartenberg which 
will serve as the point of departure for the remainder of this thesis. 
It is now our task to examine the meaning of transcendental object 
as it is presented by the express text of Kant. We are particularly 
interested in determining whether the tentative interpretation of 
transcendental object suggested above will withstand the test of Kant's 
text as a valid interpretation. In Chapter II we will concentrate pri-
65William Wallace takes the similar position that totality is the 
implicit basis of all experience even though it is never actually pre-
sent. W. Wallace, Kant (Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1902), pp • 
............ 
180 ff. 
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marily on te~t6 from ~ Analytic exclusive of the Transcendental 
Deductio~. We will examine the text of the Transcendental Deduction 
in Chapter III in order to clarify further the meaning of transcendental 
object and to discover the function of the transcendental object in the 
grounding of the categories. Finally, in Chapter IV we will examine 
the text of the Dialectic to complete our understanding of the meaning 
of transcendental object and to discover its function in Kant's resolu-
tion of reason's natural conflict with itself. 
CHAPTER II 
A TEXTUAL EXAMINATION OF WHAT KANT MEANS 
BY TRANSCENDENTAL OBJECT 
In Chapter I a review of Kantian commentators indicated that the 
great majority fall into three general categories. (a) those who inter-
pret transcendental object as identical with thing-in-itself, (b) those 
who identify it with subjectivity in some way and distinct from the 
thing-in-itself, and (c) those who interpret transcendental object as 
some kind of correlate of mere subjectivity and in some way distinct 
from thin~-in-itself. We will defer until Chapter III any direct dis-
cussion of the relationship between subjectivity and the transcendental 
object. 
In this ohapter we are primarily concerned with establishing the 
general meaning of transcendental object by an examination of Kant's 
express text. The general direction of this examination is suggested 
by M. Wartenberg's interpretation of transcendental object as we present-
ed it in Chapter I. We will search for Kant's meaning in terms of the 
following questionsl (a) Is transcendental object distinct from both 
thing-in-itself (noumenon) and phenomenon as such? (b) Is it some kind 
of third something? (c) Is it involved with totality in some way? (d) 
What does transcendental object have to do with synthesis and the "-X", 
or the unknown? (e) Is the transcendental object involved with the world 
of appearances in some way? 22 
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A. Phenomenon vs. Noumenon vs. Transcendental Object 
One of the most explicit and clear cut statements that transcenden-
tal object is not the same as thing-in-itself (noumenon) is contained in 
The Ground £t ~ Distinction of ~ Objects 1£ General ~ Phenomena 
and Noumena in the First Edition of the Critique. 
Here Kant is more properly concerned with the distinction between 
phenomena and noumena; he does not engage in a comprehensive and exact 
exposition of the doctrine of transcendental object. He mentions trans-
cendental object as it is relevant to the distinction between phenomena 
and noumena. Later we shall be enabled to see that his statement re-
garding transcendental object is consistent as it appears throughout 
both editions. 
Kant states that understanding refers all appearances to a ~-
thing, as the object of sensible intuition. This is a something. x, 
i.e., IItranscendental object = XII, which, as a correlate of the unity of 
apperception,1 serves only for the unity of the manifold in sensible 
intuition. It is an II ... XII because 
it is not itself an object of knowledge, but only the 
representation of appearances under the concept of an 
object in general - a concept which is determinable 
through the manifold of these appearances. 2 
1This description, as correlate, by itself, does not present a 
complete notion of the doctrine. This is clear from our discussions of 
the proper relationship betw~en transcendental object and the unity of 
apperception at pp. Si-Sa of ~his thesis. 
Kant goes on to say. 
The object to which I relate appearance in general 
is the transcendental object, that is, the completely 
indeterminate thought of something in general. This 
cannot be entitled noumenon; for I know nothing of what 
it is in itself, and have no concept of it save as merely 
the object of a sensible intuition in general, and so as 
being one and the same for all appearances.3 
This text speaks for itself. Transcendental object is not thing-in-
24 
itself (noumenon). It is a pure object which is the same for all appear-
ances. 4 It is our thesis that this is a thoroughly mature critical doc-
trine, maintained in both editions. 
We must admit that Kant's deletion of this passage in the Second 
Edition is, at first glance, a compelling temptation to contend that he 
might have felt in 1787 that its doctrine was not really as compatible 
with his system as he thought it was in 1781. It is understandable 
that this omission could be taken as an indication that "transcendental 
object ... x" means thing-in-itself. But the preponderance of evidence 
is against this view. Kant is totally silent as to any retraction re-
garding transcendental object. Furthermore, he upholds all doctrines 
essential to transcendental object in the Second Edition. 
We feel that Kant dropped this passage in the Second Edition to 
maintain his consistent avoidance of the term "transcendental object" 
until after the doctrine of the Paralogisms is presented. This omission 
of the term is primarily for pedagogical, not doctrinal, reasons. The 
II 4There could be no clearer donfirmation of the doctrine at A108-9 
1\137). See p. 53 of this thesis. 
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Paralogisms clears the air of any possible improper employment of the 
idea of transcendental object, which is so essential to ~ Analytic, 
but which only confuses the argument when "= x" leads one to judge 
precipitously that transcendental object is noumenon. Furthermore, 
since Kant has avoided use of this ~ in the Second Edition Analytic, 
it would not be consistent for him to use the term here where he is 
trying to clarify the proper distinction between phenomena and noumena, 
5 
as this distinction is relevant to the Analytic. 
At the very end of the passage at A248=!lQ2 Kant makes it quite 
clear that the categories, since they are merely the form of the employ-
ment of the understanding, are not ~ themselves capable of determining 
any object. Following immediately is the section developing an explicit 
doctrine of transcendental object, part of which we have quoted aboveo 
This was dropped in the Second Edition in favor of the following expo-
sition of the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. 
Kant points out that we are subject to the illusion that since the 
categories are not grounded, as regards their origin, in sensibility, 
they "allow of an application extending beyond all objects of the sen-
6 
ses." 13ut the categories, simply modes of combining the manifold, 
signify no object at all apart from intuition wherein the manifold is 
giveno The fact that the mode in which we intuit sensible objects 
(phenomena) is distinguished from the object in itself gives the illusion 
5Compare N. K. Smith, Commentary, pp. 406-1, rei A248-49. 
613305 (266). 
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that we posit this nature in itself as opposed to phenomena, ~ that 
it exists as a purely intelligible entity. The question then arises 
whether the categories have meaning applicable to 3uch intelligible 
7 
entities (BEumena), i.e., whether we know them. 
11 ~ ~~, that the understanding validly forms a representation 
of an object in itself at the very same time that it denominates an 
object ~ .El,lenomenon. But,due to an ambiguity, -the understanding 
comes to represent itself as also being able to form concepts £! ~ 
objects ~ totally outside appearances. Since the only concepts the 
understanding yields are categories, the understanding supposes that it 
8 
at least thinks the object l!!. itself (as totally outside appearances) 
through 1h£~ categories. But in this manner understanding is misled 
by the "object's" character ~ something-.i£. general outside ~ sensi-
bility. It is misled to take that which is in fact an entirely inde-
terminate idea of an intelligible entity for a determinate idea of a 
real enity, which we can know through the understanding in some manner 
9 
or other. 
But the fact is that knowledge of a noumenon in the positive sense 
of the word, i.e., as an object of an intellectual intuition, is quite 
8 As such it is not really object, but thing-in-itself (noumenon). 
91 have substituted my own paraphrase of the text as it appears at 
p. 277 of Werke since I find Smith's translation (pp. 267-8) of this 
difficult passage at B306-7 to be extremely difficult to understand. 
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impossible. It is impossible since the categories have no meaning, 
except in relation to the synthesis of intuition in space and time. 
We can only speak of noumenon in the negative sense, i.e., as ~ 
being an object of sensible intuition, ~ ~ totally abstracted ~ 
10 
even our mode of sensible intuition. 
This exposition in the Second Edition is a much better, and even 
a more accurate presentation of Kant's authentic doctrine regarding 
noumenon than that which appeared in the First Edition. This alone is 
sufficient reason for Kant to SUbstitute the new exposition. We need 
not assume that Kant did so because he was dissatisfied with his doctrine 
of transcendental object. Kant not only does not destroy the doctrine 
in this Second Edition formulation; he in fact confirms most of its 
basic elements: the categories' ground as to origin is not in sensibil-
ity; the understanding forms a representation of an object in itself; the 
understanding cannot apply any determinate concepts to such an object; 
this object possesses the character of being in general outside our 
sensibility (though referring to possible sense experience, and thus 
not totally outside all appearances); this object is not to be taken as 
the object of any intellectual intuition (thus is not noumenon in the 
positive sense). Furthermore, since noumenon in the negative sense is 
totally abstracted from ~ ~ ~ of sensible intUition, we see 
that transcendental object cannot be noumenon even in the negative sense, 
10B307-309 (268-70). 
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since "transcendental object "" x" refers to "the object of a sensible 
11 
intuition in general." 
B. The Amphiboly--Transcendental 
Object a Third Something 
Kant again introduces his doctrine of transcendental object in 
~ Amphiboly as a very clear and very important confirmation of his 
12 
mature critical doctrine. Here Kant is not simply telling his pre-
critical belief in thing-in-itself, even though this object-in-itself 
cannot be conceived in the categories; Kant does not show himself to be 
skeptical about his own doctrine of transcendental object as has been 
13 
contended o 
The following passage is apparently of major importance for those 
who take transcendental object to mean thing-in-itself (noumenon)1 
Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, but 
does not thereby extend its own sphere. In the process 
of warning the latter that it must not presume to olaim 
applicability to things in themselves but only to appear-
ances, it ~ indeed think ~ itself ~ object in itself, 
~ only!.!. transcendental object, which II ill cause .£!. 
.ppearance and therefore not itself aEEearance, and which 
can be ihougnt neither as-guant1ty n£t !.!. reality n£t ~ 
substance, etc. (because these concepts always reguire 
sensible forms in which they determine ~ object.) We 
are completely ignorant whether it is to be met with 
in us or outside us, whether it would be at once re-
11A253 (271). 
12A211~B333 (286), A281-B343 to A289~B345. 
13 Cf • N. K. Smith, ~. ~., p. 412 Re. A288=B344-45. Cf. also 
214-150 
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moved with the cessation of sensibility, or whether in 
the absence of sensibility it would remain. If ~ ~ 
pleas'!! 1.2. ill!:!!!!. ~ object noumenon f.2.!. lli reason ~ 14 
.!!.! representation h ~ sensible, !!!. ~ !:E.!.!. to .2:.2. ~. 
We must take care to examine this text in the light of its larger 
context. At first glance Kant seems to be equating transcendental 
object with thing-in-itself15 since he says we cannot apply any of the 
categories to this object and that we may name it noumenon if we so 
please. It is only when we look before and after this exact text that 
we see Kant himself pointing out the folly of such an interpretation. 
At A287 c B343 (293) Kant states that thought in pure employment on 
its own without any aid from sensibility is without !!!. object. We 
could not call a noumenon an object for this pure employment of the 
understanding because noumenon signifies only a problematic concept of 
16 
an object for an intuition and understanding quite different from ours. 
"The concept of the noumenon is, therefore, not the concept of an 
object.,,17 It is simply a problem unavoidably bound up with the problem 
of whether or not there are any objects entirely disengaged from sense 
18 
intuition. Such "objects" cannot be absolutely denied simply because 
14A288=B344-45 Underlining supplied for emphasis of the crucial 
elements which would seem to contradict our thesis. 
15 
cf. N. K. Smith, Commentary, p. 214. Smith here again states 
that transcendental object, as employed in ~ Amphiboly, means thing-
in-itself. 
16A288aB343-44 (293). 
17A288=B344 (293). M. Wartenberg points out that for us the noumenon 
simply is not an object at all. Cf. M. Wartenberg,.2e.. ill., p. 166. 
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we have no determinate concepts of them since they are not given in 
intuition. But, nevertheless, they cannot be asserted to be objects 
19 
for our understanding. At this point we have arrived at the crucial 
text quoted above. 
In the text quoted Kant simply states that the und~rstanding, as 
it warns sensibility that it does not extend to things-in-themselves, 
does indeed think an object in itself, but only as transcendental object, 
not as some noumenal "object". What is more, this object is not mere 
appearance, since it is the ground (Ursache) of appearance (as necessary 
20 
object). In other words, transcendental object is neither mere ap-
pearance nor thing in itself; 1i ~ ~ third something, namely, pure 
object. He goes on to say that the categories in no way can be applied 
to this transcendental object and that we are totally ignorant of what 
this objec~ is in itself. The transcendental object equals x, i.e., 
is unknown. Kant is thoroughly consistent here. He then ironically 
admits that critios may call this object noumenon simply because its 
21 
representation is not sensible, if they so please. But he immediately 
adds in the next sentence that such a noumenal "object" would be of no 
19.!"!?M.. 
20The object is not given ~ known ~ necessary object ~ ~ 
appearance. Its necessity as object appears only when it is represent-
ed in apprehension as grounded in transcendental object - x. 
21Edward Caird, ! Critical Account of ~ Philosophy of ~ (Glasgow 
James Machelhose, 1877), pp. 499-500. Caird with admirable critical 
scrutiny of the matter, is not lead to an interpretation of Kantian 
"skepticism", but rather, points out that our"liberty" here is a dubious 
sort of libertv ... 
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service except to limit sensible knowledge. It would open a space which 
we could fill neither with pure understanding ~ !iih possible experi-
22 
ence. But Kant's authentic idea of transcendental object does not 
leave a space which cannot be filled with possible experience. The 
idea of transcendental object applies validly to the possible totality 
of synthesis of all appearances in intuition. Since this totality of 
synthesis can never be accomplished, the transcendental object always 
remains unknown or " ... x". 
In the very next sentence Kant reinforces his sarcasm by pointing 
out that the Critique does not allow the understanding to create a new 
field of objects beyond appearances in an intelligible world. To do so 
would be to employ the understanding contrary to its vocation, to make 
"objects, that is, possible intuitions, conform to concepts, not con-
cepts to possible intuitions, on whioh alone their objeotive validity 
rests. 1I23 
When we employ the understanding in its proper vocation and think 
the pure object, transcendental object, we apply this idea ("ooncept") 
with objective validity to the possible totality of synthesis in intuition 
of all appearances in experience. It is by sheer illusion that we assume 
this pure object to be a thing-in-itself which is independent of possible 
intuition. In such illusion we are employing understanding contrary to 
its vocation; we make the object, i.e., possible intuition, conform to 
~he ooncept. The only relationship between transcendental object and 
22A288-89=B345 (293-4). 
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noumenon is the illusory leap from the transcendental object in the 
world of appearances (even though distinct from ~ appearances) to 
24 
the noumenon in a purely intelligible world. 
There is one other employment of the term transcendental object 
in ~ Amphiboly. At A211-18=B333-34, Kant is discussing matter. He 
makes it quite clear that matter is not even among the objects for pure 
understanding. It should thus be apparent that transcendental object 
does not mean thing in itself when Kant saysa 
•• otranscendental object on the other hand, which is 
granted the role of the ground of this appearance which 
we name matter, is a pure something of which we would_ 
understand nothing, which is what it would be Lror u!l 
even if someone might be capable of expressing it to 
us. For we can understand only that which brings with 2 
it, in intuition. something corresponding to our words. 5 
We would not be able to understand such an object, even if someone else 
could express it to us. In order to understand (know) an object, we 
must, of ourselves, have an accomplished intuition of it. We know we 
can have no such an accomplished intuition of the totality of appear-
ances at any time. Therefore we cannot at any time ~ transcenden-
24contrast with Bruno Bauch's interpretation of the relationship 
between thing-in-itself and transcendental object. Contrast also Hans 
Cornelius' interpretation. Cf. supra, pp. 14-16. 
25This is my translation of the teat at A211=B333 (Werke, p. 291), 
IIdas transcendentale Objekt aber, welches der Grund dieser Erscheinung 
sein mag, die wir Materie nennen, ist ein blosses Etwas, wovon wir nicht 
einmal verstehen wtirden, was es sei, wenn es uns auch jemand sagen 
kennte. Dennwir kennan nichts verstehen, als was ein unsern Worten 
korrespondierends in der Anschauung mit sich ftihret.1I 
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tal object, the ultimate ground of that appearing object which we 
name matter. 
C. A Note on the Significance of Completeness and 
Totality in the Critique £! ~ Reason 
In his Introduction to the Critique Kant makes the extremely 
important point that ~ complete system of the philosophy £! pure reason 
is possible because it studies ~ the nature £i things, which is 
inexhaustible, but rather it studies the nature of the ~ priori knowledge 
££ understanding, which passes judgement on the nature of things. This 
faculty of understanding is limited and thus is the object of a possibly 
26 
complete study. 
A demand for the completeness of his system is of major importance 
to Kant in his critical philosophy. At the beginning of the Transcen-
dental Analytic Kant points out that the completeness of the Analytic 
can be guaranteed 
only by means of ~ idea £! ~ totality of the ~ priori 
knowledge yielded by the understanding; such an idea can 
furnish an exact classification of the concepts which com-
pose that totality, exhibiting their interconnection in 
a system. 27 
This idea of totality must be sharply distinguished from the idea 
of a sum total of possibility, an idea of omnitudo realitatis, which, 
as Kant states in ~ Ideal £!~ Reason, is the concept of a thing-
in-itself as completely determined, i.e., a transcendental ideal which 
26A11 =B25 - A16aB30 (58-62). 
21B89-90_A65 (102). 
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serves as a basis for the complete determination of everything that 
exists. This is an idea of God. 28 
This distinction between an idea of totality of phenomena and an 
idea of total possibility (ideal of pure reason) becomes clearer in 
Kant's criticism of the physioo-theological proof. Kant states that 
the proof fails in part because it tries to ascribe some magnitude to 
a cause supreme in respeot to the world when we "are not acquainted with 
29 
the whole oontent of the world still less do we know how to estimate 
its magnitude by comparison with all that is possible.,,30 
Kant explicitly distinguishes degrees of objeotive reality.31 The 
oategories are of oourse closest to objective reality. The ideal is 
furthest removed from objective reality since it is "an individual 
thing, determinable or even determined by the idea alone. 32 The idea, 
however, is in a middle position. For ideas, 
no appearance can be found in which they can be represented 
in Qpncreto. They contain a certain cQmpletencss to which 
no possible empirical knowledge ever Lactuall~ attains. 
29The reason the whole content of the world is unknown is, of course, 
~bat an advance to totality in the empirical order is impossible. Thus 
Kant is forced to say that the physico-theological argument is really 
no different than the ontologioal because it is in part based on the idea 
whioh applies validly to the possible total regress in the synthesis of 
intuition; an idea which produces no knowledge however. Cf. A628-30RB 
657-58 (523). 
30A622-23aB650-51 (519). 
32~. 
In them reason aims only at a systematic unity, to which it 
seeks to approximate the unity that is empirically possible, 
without ever reaching it. 33 
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We must further distinguish between an idea of possible total 
regress in the empirical synthesis and such an idea as the idea of 
the simple nature of the thinking self, The former is an idea found 
in the transcendental a priori synthetic proposition, "The world of 
nature is a unified totality of necessity." As Kant observes in "Ths 
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Discipline of Pure Reason", the proof of such a proposition cannot 
go beyond the concept of its object without special guidance from out-
side the concept. The proof of such a proposition "proceeds by showing 
that experience itsslf, and therefore the object of experience, would 
be impossible without a connection of this kind.,,35 On the other hand, 
the proof of an assertion of pure reason, like that of the simple 
nature of the thinking self, is faced with unavoidable difficulty, since 
the notion of absolute simplicity cannot be immediately related to a 
perception.36 
In a word, our reason can employ as conditions of the 
possibility of things only the conditions of possible ex-
perience; it oan never proceed to form concepts of things 
quite independently of these conditions. Suoh concepts, 37 
though not self-contradictory, would be without an object. 
35A783 =B811 (621). 
37A771-B799 (613)0 
Thus Kant must says 
A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere idea 
ot reason i! used in explanation of natural existences 
LNaturding!i would really be no explanation ••• 38 
But he must also sayl 
36 
As regards the absolute totality of the ground of expla-
nation of the series of these causes, such totality need 
suggest no difficulty in respect of natural existences 
LWeltobjekt!l; since these existences are nothing but 
appearances, we need never look to them for any kind 
of completeness in the synthesis of the series of con-
ditions .39 
We need not look to mere appearances for any kind of completeness, 
but this completeness, this totality which grounds the series of causes, 
is guaranteed as valid for reason, even though it is not productive of 
knowledge, by the fact that experience and objscts of experience are in 
fact possible, but would be impossible without such an idea of totality 
of unity and necessity in the world of natural objects to ground their 
very objectivity in experience. We shall see Kant ground the valid 
objective employment of the categories in this idea of the totality of 
phenomena, i.e., the idea of transcendental object, in the Transcendental 
Deduction. 
D. The Unknown or ":: x" and the Nature 
of Synthetic Judgements 
Kant first speaks of an Unknown or "= x" in his Introduction to 
40 
the Critique. Kant here refers to meaning which unknown within the 
37A771 =B799 (613). 39A773 =B801 (615). 
h_. 40 A9 u B1'3 (50-51). Norman Kemp Smith notes here that "~ Unbe-I~annte :: x" is subst! tuted in :B for "das x". 
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subject of a proposition or judgement which is nevertheless united with 
that subject by means of the predicate in a synthetic judgement. This 
Unknown or " .. x" points out how synthetic judgement differs from an-
alytic judgement in that it reaches outside the meaning contained within 
the concept of the subject in order to add to this knowledge the new, 
hitherto unknown or "a x", meaning contained within the concept of the 
predicate; similarly, the idea of transcendental object is synthetically 
applied to a possible but never actual totality in the synthesis of all 
appearances in a single experience. The transcendental object remains 
41 forever unknown not because the totality is noumenal, but rather be-
cause the totality of synthesis in intuition remains forever a mere 
possibility, never an actuality. 
At the beginning of the Transcendental Logic Kant says "Our 
nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than 
sensible: that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected 
by objectso,,42 Thus intuition gives us only ~ ~ of being affected. 
Intuition alone does not give us object known as such. Object, as such, 
must be thought by the understanding. 
This is not to say that knowledge occurs in isolation from intuition. 
41Korner says that "the idea of the completion of an unlimited 
process is that of a !!.2!!,-phenomenon, intelligible or thing in itself." 
Kant (Baltimorez Penguin, 1955), p. 117. Korner does not explicitly 
discuss transcendental object and apparently does not suspect any further 
subtleties in Kant's position on totality. E. Caird, J. Collins, and 
J. E. Smith also consider a totality of phenomena to be noumenal. Cf. 
pp. 4-6 of this thesis. 
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Kant makes it quite clear that knowledge of an object is validly 
possible only when thoueht of an object is in synthetic union with the 
intuition in which the object is given.43 
Furthermore, in the "Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic", 
Kant states that through his doctrine of the pure a priori intuitions 
we know that a priori synthetic judgements "can never extend beyond 
objects of the senses; they are valid only for objects of possible 
44 
experience." It is important to note that Kant Bays "pos~ible experi-
ence". It is also important to note that this limit of validity is due 
to the fact that a purely intellectual intuition is not possible for us. 
Our intuition is sensible, thus not original, and thus not capable of 
giving us the existence of an object. Our mode of intuition is depen-
dent upon the existence of an object and is possible only it ~ 
faculty of representation is affected by ~ object.45 
Pure a priori knowledge of object is possible in the aJJplication 
of pure concepts of objects in general to pure intuitions in which 
objects in general are given, but not known. 46 This knowledge of an 
object is the result of an a priori synthetic judgement in which a 
unity unknown to the manifold of pure intuition is applied to that 
intuition by pure concepts of the understanding, (i.e., categories). 
44B73 (90-1). 
46A50-51=B74-75 (92). This pure a priori knowledge is distinguish-
ed from knowledge in which the concept and intuition are empirical. 
'rhis latter knowledge of objects is possible only -.!.. ~osteriori. 
39 
Kant must ground the validity of this synthetic application of 
unity to the manifold of intuition. He must justify this synthetic 
thinking ££ objective unity ~ the given manifold of intuition by the 
understanding. This unity of object is ll2i known within the manifold of 
intuition. Thus we will not be able to find the ground for applying 
such unity in an examination of the nature of the synthesis of intu-
ition. We will have to examine the nature of the spontaneous presen-
tation of synthesis of the understanding. Kant makes it quite clear 
that we are justified in an examination of the role of the understand-
ing in the process of knowledge, as separate from the role of intuition 
or sensibility, even though we fully recognize that only through the 
union of the two does knowledge of objects arise.47 
Cassirer points out that mere sensation is receptive and passive, 
and as mere sensation it is not an awareness of objects. His important 
observation points up the fact that objects must be thought, not in-
tuited, even though this thought is empty and not at all productive of 
knowledge unless it is applied to sense intuitions. Our mode of intu-
ition is dependent upon the existence of objects, but this existence is 
48 
not known as object in mere intuition. 
48contrast H. W. Cassirer. Kant's First Criti~~e.(New Yorka 
Macmillan, 1954), pp. 27-28, 42-43, 225-26, 234, 23. But contrast 
this with his statement that things-in-themselves are only problematical; 
cf. pp. 227, 230. Edward Caird, H. Herring, B. Bauch and R. Adamson 
also assume that phenomena are grounded in things-in-themselves in some 
way; cf. pp. 7 & 16 of this thesis. 
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But we must take care not to assume that Kant's position is that 
appearances are grounded in things-in-themselves, and that our pre-
supposition of the reality of thing-in-itself guarantees the reality 
of sensible phenomena. 
We know that the reality of sensible phenomena cannot be guar-
anteed for speculative reason by something which is outside the realm 
of speculative reason. Things-in-themselves are definitely not valid 
objects for speculative reason; they are entirely outside the realm of 
the valid employment of speculative reason. The guarantee for the 
reality of sensible phenomena, and the ground of appearances as unities 
or objects (not as mere appearances which are no more than the manifold 
of intuition) must be one and the same thing, namely, "transcendental 
object = x". The synthetic character of their unity, i.e., the appli-
cation of unity to sensible phenomena as mere appearances which is 
outside their mere manifoldness in themselves, demands a ground for 
its validity. We shall see Kant say that this ground is "transcen-
dental object .. x". Thus "transcendental object" must not mean thing-
in-itself because speculative reason is not competent to deal with 
things:in-themselves. 
Kant himself makes this quite clear. In his Second Preface Kant 
says, " ••• the object is to be taken in a twofold sense, namely as 
appearance and as thing in itself.,,49 As thing9in-itself we know nothing 
of object with pure speculative reason. Thus such things as freedom 
49Bxxvi (28). 
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':, and morality as they are in our souls, or in the soul of others, in 
themselves, are not valid objects for pure speculative reason. We 
must, however, remember that these will come forth as valid objects 
of pure reason in its practical employment. 50 "I have ••• found it 
51 
necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.1I The 
"transcendental object = XII is not, however, an object of faith; it II 
--
an object of speculative reason. 
A concept such as Causality (an objective order of necessity in 
nature) and the idea which serves as its ground (the idea of IItranscen-
dental object m XII), will apply to an object only in the first sense, 
52 
IInamely as appearance". 
E. The Analogies--Transcendental Object 
in the World of Appearances 
In the Analogies Kant is largely concerned with the proper appli-
cation of the various categories to various perceptions to produce 
valid objective knowledge. He is not primarily concerned here with 
the grounding of the a priori validity of the categories themselves. 
Thus we find little or no development of his doctrine of transcendental 
object as such. 
However, Norman Kemp Smith's remark that the term transcendental 
object, as it appears in the Analogies, can mean only thing-in-itself 53 
affords an excellent occasion to see the importance of Kant's authentic 
50Bxxviii_xxiv (28-29). 
52Bxxviii-Bxxix (28-29). 53 N• K. Smith. Commentary, p. 214. 
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meaning of the term. This is important for both properly translating 
the text and properly following Kant's line of argument. 
Kant points out that no one will grant him that the manifold of 
a house is sucessive just because his apprehension of the manifold is 
successive. This makes him immediately aware that 
as soon as I extend my idea of object to include 
its transcendental significance, the house is not 
al all_a thing in itself, but on the contrary 
Lit i~ merely an appearance, that is, a repre~en­
tation whose transcendental object is unknown.?4 
To conclude tllat transcendental object here means thing-in-itself 
is to oversimplify Kant's meaning. Kant has indicated immediately prior 
to this passage that things-in-themselves are apart from the represen-
tations through which they affect us. 55 Here transcendental object is 
not apart from the representation but is to serve as the key to deter-
mine how necessary conneotion in time can be shown to belong to appear-
ances in themselves in spite of the fact that they are not things-in-
themselves, and in spite of the fact that their representation in 
apprehension is always successive. For example, he must show that the 
house, as an appearance, is not successive in its parts even though our 
representation of its appearance in apprehension is successive. As a 
mere appearance, i.e. representation whose transcendental object remains 
54This is my translation of the text at A190-91=B235-6. "Nun ist 
aber, so bald ioh meine Begriffe von einem Gegenstande bis zur trans-
oendentalen Bedeutung steigere, das Haus gar kein Ding an sich selbst, 
sondern nur eine Erscheinung, d.i. Vorstellung, deren transcendentaler 
Gegenstand unbekannt ist;" (Werke, p. 228). 
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unrecognized, such a feat is impossible. But when "transcendental 
object = XII is recognized to be the a priori ground of the a priori 
objective validity of the application of a category such as "Community" 
to the manifold of the house, then we can show that the manifold of 
the house is necessarily not successive. 56 
Thing-in-itself (noumenon) could obviously never serve as such 
a ground. Quite obviously then, transcendental object could not mean 
thing-in-itself (noumenon).57 It must in fact be intimately involved 
with the world of appearances, even though it is distinct from mere 
58 
appearances. 
To summarize, in Chapter II we have seen textual evidence to 
support an interpretation of transcendental object as followsr (a) 
Even though the transcendental object is something in general outside 
56This doctrine thus makes the arguments from A191::11B236 thru A211= 
B256 (220-223) much more lucid. 
57We should not confuse a concept such as causality of nature, or 
any of the validly applied categories, with something like purposive-
ness in nature, which is "a particular conoept ~ priori, which has 
its origin solely in the reflective judgement." Kant, ~ Critique 
2£ Judgement, translated by J. H. Bernard (London: Macmillan, 1931), 
pp. 19-20. This purposiveness is neither of nature nor of freedom. 
"It ascribes nothing to the object (of nature), but only represents 
the peculiar way in which we must prooeed in reflection upon the objects 
of nature in reference to a thoroughly connected experience and is 
oonsequently a subjective principle (maxim) of judgement." ~~. p. 24). 
This sort of principle serves as a link between the speculative and 
practical employment of pure reason, but has nothing to do with 
ascribing objective unity to appearances nor with the ultimate grounding 
of this objectivity. 
58Cf • our discussion of E. Adickes on this point, p. 14 of this 
thesis. 
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our sensibility, it is not noumenon, i.e., thing-in-itself. Since 
transcendental object is an object in general outside our sensibility, 
it cannot be identified with mere phenomena, which are sense represen-
tations. (b) The transcendental object, since it is not an object of 
either sensible intuition or intell~ctual intuition, and since it is 
not totally removed from our mode of sensing an object, is neither mere 
phenomenon, nor noumenon in either the positive or negative sense. 
Thus the transcendental object must be a third something, namely, the 
pure form of objectivity in general and the ground of the objective 
neoessity in appearanoes. (0) The idea of transcendental objeot repre-
sents a possible totality in the synthesis of sensible representations 
(phenomena). (d) The idea of transcendental object, therefore, can 
never be validly applied to an actual sense representation since the 
totality always eludes actual sensation. Thus the transcendental object 
must remain forever an 11= X", an unknown. Nevertheless, the idea of 
transcendental object (e) can be validly applied to the possible totality 
in the synthesis of appearances. In fact, we shall see in Chapter III 
of this thesis that this application of the idea of transcendental 
objeot to the possible totality of phenomena (appearances) is the ulti-
mate a priori justifioation for thinking objectivity synthetically into 
the manifold of mere appearances. It is now our task in Chapter III 
to examine how transcendental object functions in this grounding of 
objectivity in synthetic a priori judgements. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ROLE OF TRANSCENDENTAL OBJECT IN 
THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC 
In Chapter II an examination of Kant's text revealed that transcen-
dental objeot can be interpr~ted as a third something between mere 
phenomenon and noumenon, namely, the pure form of objectivity in general. 
We found the transcendental object to be represented in an idea which 
is validly applied to a possible totality in the synthesis of phenomena 
in intuition. We found, further, that the transcendental object remains 
an "= x" or unknown because the synthesis in intuition can never be 
actually completed. 
Thus far we have found a workable definition of transcendental 
object which is definitely contradictory to the first general category 
of commentators outlined in our Chapter I. It is now our task to 
examine Kant's teit in order to see how transcendental object, as we 
have interpreted it, functions in the grounding of the objectivity of 
our knowledge. Since this function is bound up with the transcendental 
unity of apperception we should also be able to determine what relation-
ship transcendental object has to the second and third general categories 
of interpretation outlined in Chapter I according to which transcendental 
object was conceived as a purely subjective entity, or merely a corre-
late of the knowing subject, or some combination of the twoo 
45 
46 
The crucial grounding of the objectivity of the synthetic a priori 
judgements, which produce knowledge of objects in the knower, occurs 
in the Transcendental Deduction. We will begin our textual examination 
of the function of transcendental object in the Deduction by following 
the exact order of Kant's subtle argument as it occurs explicitly in 
the Transcendental Deduction of the First Edition. We will find that 
the argument is a very compact and continuous whole, but does progress 
through the following recognizable stagesl (a) a statement of the 
problem as the necessity to justify the application of the categories 
to phenomena; (b) the relationship of the general synthetic unity and 
necessity of any object as such to the unity of apperception and the 
transcendental object; (c) the argument proper of the Deduction, ground-
ing the necessary unity of consciousness, the transcendental unity of 
apperception, objectivity as such, and thus, the application of the 
categories by the understanding. 
After this close examination of the First Edition Deduction it will 
be necessary to examine the doctrine of the Deduction in the Second Edi-
tionsince Kant omits any explicit use of the term "transcendental object" 
in this recasting of the deduction. Thus we are concerned (d) with the 
doctrine of transcendental object and the doctrine of the Second Edition 
Deduction. Finally, (e) we will examine the Analytic of Principles, 
which is substantially the same in both editions, in order to see if 
there is any confirmation of the role of transcendental object (doctrin-
ally, if not by the term itself) in the Deduction as proposed by Kant 
in 1787. 
"~ . 
. ~, 
A. Kant's Statement of the Problem of 
the Transcendental Deduction 
47 
In the section on The Principles of Any Transcendental Deduction 
Kant states that only through the representation which is a priori 
determinant of the object is it possible to know anything ~ ~ object 
at all. Only in so far as there are representations in the understand-
ing which are determinant of object in general is it possible to think 
objective necessity (e.g. necessary order in nature, causality). But 
the synthetic representation of intuition is determinant only of empir-
ical object; this representation must of necessity relate to and be 
determined by an a priori concept of object in general for us to think 
it as object of experience at all. Representations in intuition by 
themselves would be foreign to one another and thus knowledge would be 
impossible if there were no a priori concepts of objects in general, 
1 
i.e., categories. 
Kant recognizes at this point that he must justify the validity 
of this aIJplication of the categories to the manifold of intuition in 
order to guarantee the validity of any knowledge of objects in experi-
ence. This difficult and complex justification is developed in the 
A Deduction explicitly in terms of his doctrine of "transcendental object= 
2 
x", and its relation to the transcendental unity of apperception. 
1A92-97=B124-130. 
2A97-110 (130-137). Prichard, on the other hand, comments that 
Kant's argument here tacitly ignores his own theory of knowledge, that the 
object proper, i.e., the thing-in-itself is unknowable; Kant's Theory of 
Knowledge (Oxford, 1909), p~ 179. 
B. The Synthetic Unity and Neceasity of Object--
Ita Relationship to the Unity of Ap-
perception and Transcen-
dental Object 
48 
Kant begins by outlining the three-fold synthesis: (1) apprehension 
in intuition, (2) reproduction in imagination, and finally (3) the syn-
thesis of recognition in a concept. This last synthesis is the synthesis 
into pure concepts of the understanding, i.e., categories. Kant points 
out that 
our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object 
carries with it an element of necessity; the object is view-
ed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being 
hapazard ~r arbitrary, ••• in so far as they Lour modes of 
knowledg~ are to relate to an object, they must necessarily 
••• possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an 
object .3 
Thus we see that the concept of an object for Kant is characteriz-
ed by necessity and unity, or more simply an object is a necessary 
unity. 
But this necessary unity is unknown (an "x") to the manifold of 
our sense representations; it is "something that has to be distinct 
from all our representations.,,4 
This necessary unity, this "x" which corresponds to the manifold 
of our representations, this object which is nothing to us ~s sense 
intuitors since it is an "x", i.e. unknown to the manifold of sense 
representationl, makes necessary lithe formal unity of consciousness in 
the synthesis of the manifold of representations. 1I5 
3A104-105 (134-5). 
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The production of the synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition 
is a prere~uisite for knowledge, but ~ synthetic unity is itself 
impossible unless 
••• generated in accordance with a rule by means of 
such a function of synthesis as makes the reproduction of the 
manifold ~ priori necessary, ~ renders possible ~ concept 
in which it is united ••• This unity £! ~ determines all 
the manifold, and limits it to conditions which ~ ~ unity 
of apperoeption possible. The concept of this unity is the 
representation o~ the object ~ ~ which I think through the 
predioates ••• 
Thus VIe see that the ob,ject ~ such makes the formal unity of con-
sciousness necessary and this unity of consciousness in turn makes the 
reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary and renders the concept 
(category) possible. The category is then a specific representation of 
the object c x, or is a specific manifestation of our representation 
~ thought of object in general. 
It is important to note in this discussion that Kant is distinguish-
ing objecl as such from sense representations as such and is also dis-
tinguishing object as such from the formal unity of consciousness, which 
makes the reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary and renders 
possible (grounds) the categories, but which is, in turn, ~ necessary 
by object as such. Thus far we see that the categories, if they are to 
apply validly ~ priori to the manifold of sense representation and thus 
result in knowledge of object, are grounded in the formal unity of 
consciousness, which the object as such renders necessary. Thus we can 
see that this formal unity of consciousness must itself be a necessary 
6A105 (1~5). Underlining supplied for emphasis (except the phrase 
IUTlitv of' "'l1iA1 
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unity, it must be objective itself, or it must be included in object-
t 
.~ ivity in some way. If this were not so, our application of the cate-
gories to the manifold of sense representation would be merely a sub-
jective compulsion or habit. Thus Hume's scepticism would conquer Kant. 
Kant must truly ground the application of the categories in something 
other than were subjective structure or psychological compulsion if 
his critical philosophy is to succeed at all. It is right here in the 
Transcendental Deduction that he is claiming to accomplish this very 
task by showing that the formal unity of consciousness, the unity of 
apperception, is a necessary unity, i.e. is objectively grounded. 
C. Kant's Grounding of the Necessary Unity of Conscious-
ness in Transcendental Apperception and the 
Ultimate Grounding of Both in Transcen-
dental Object--the Argument of 
the Core of the Deduction 
Kant states I 
All necessity, without exception, is grounded in a 
transcendental condition. There must, therefore, be a trans-
cendental ground of the necessary unity of consciousness in 
the synthesis of the manifold •• _.and consequently also of the 
concepts of objects in general Lcategorie~, and so af all 
objects of experience, a ground without which it would be 
impossible to think any object for our intuitions; for this 
object is no more than that something, tbe concept of which 
expresses such a necessity of synthesis. 7 
This transcendental ground is I~O other than transcendental apper-
8 
ception." It is distinguished from empirical apperception, or inner 
sense which is merely empirical and always changing. In fact, the 
necessary unity of consciousness "cannot be thought as such through 
51 
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empirical data." To render it valid "there must be a condition which 
precedes all experience, and which makes experience itself Possible",10 
namely the transcendental unity of apperception. 
This transcendental unity of apperception constitutes 
a connection according to laws of all representations of all 
possible appearances which can stand along side one another 
in one experience. 11 
Thus, the 
o 0 ooriginal and necessary consciousness of the identity 
of the self is ••• at the same time a consciousness of an 
equally necessary unity of the synthesis £! ~ appearances 
according ~ concepts, that is, according to rules, which not 
only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing 
determine ~ object for the1r intuition, that is, the concept 
of something wherein they lJ.e. all possible appearance~ are 
necessarily interconnected. 12 
Thus for Kant, the transcendental unity of apperception ill!£~ 
~ llll ~ objectively necessary ground of all possible experience, 13 
involves two aspects. It involves on the one hand the original and 
necessary consciousness of the identity of the self, and on the other 
hand, the necessary unity of the synthesis of ~ possible appearances 
according to rules which determine ~ ob,ject for their intUition, i.e. 
Ithe concept of something whe:rein all possible appearances are necessarily 
interconnected. It is this latter aspect of the transcendental unity 
of apperception which makes the former aspect an original ~ necessary 
10~. 
11 A108 • My translation. 12A108 (136-7). 
13 Cf • our discussion of R. Kroner at p. 14 of Chapter I in this 
~hesis. 
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consciousness of the identity of the self rather than a mere subjective 
~ssociation. Without this latter aspect the objectivity of all our 
knowledge 'would fall victim to Hume IS scepticism. It seems that this 
latter aspect is very close to ,7hat Kant means by "transcendental object 
" 14 = x • 
We first recognize that we are the ~ subject applying the various 
categories to the manifold of various syntheses of intuition in a 
necessary manner. This is the necessary consciousness of the identity 
of the self. But in this recognition is necessarily included a recog-
nition of the possibility of a complete experience of the totality of 
all the manifold of intuition. 15 
At this point Kant tells us that we are now in a position "to 
14It seems here that Kant's text would almost justify our stating 
that the transcendental unity of apperception, in so far as it is the 
objectively necessary ground of all possible experience of objects, 
a in ill.i constituted of the original consciousness of the self ~ 
the necessary unity of synthesis of all appearances, rather than that 
it merely involves both these elements. However, we feel that this 
interpretation would possibly be too extreme to hold up univocally 
uhroughout the Critigue, especially in the face of those texts where 
~ranscendental object is presented as some sort of correlate of self, 
even abme sort of correlate of the transcendental unity of apperception 
(in abstraction from its necessity). E. Adickes seems to indicate 
yhis involvement of transcendental object with the transcendental unity 
of apperception of some degree; Kant und ~ Ding ~~, pp. 97-112. 
Refer also to our discussion of H. J. de Vleeschauwer and R. Kroner 
in Chapter I of this thesis. 
15Thi3 possible totality includes not only our intuition of our 
own identical subject, (as an object of inner sense intuition), but 
also the intuition of the non self (as an object of outer sense intuition). 
rurthermore, this recognition includes a recognition that the transcen-
iental object must remain an "x" (unknown) because .!!l order !£.!:. it 12. 
~ knowledge the understanding would have to apply concepts of unity to 
this manifold mf appearances in an accomplished intuition. 
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determine more adequately our concept of an object in general. ,,16 Kant 
then gives a lucid exposition of what he means by transcendental object: 
Appearances are the sole objects which can be given 
to us immediately, and that in them which relat~s immediately 
to the object is called intuition. But these appearances 
are not things in themselves; they are only representations, 
which in turn have their object--an object which cannot 
itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named 
the non-empirical, that is transcendental object = x:17 
Kant further statesl 
The pure concept of this transcendental object, which 
in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and 
the same, is what can alone confer upon all our empirical 
concepts in general relation to an object, that is, object-
ive reality. This concept cannot contain any determinate 
intuition, and therefore refers only to that unity which 
must be met with in any manifold of knowledge which stands 
in relation to an object. 18 
Kant goes on to say that this relation !£ object is nothing but 
the necessary a priori unity of consciousness without which there would 
19 be no objective necessity. This necessary ~ priori unity £! ~-
sciousnes~ is a great deal more than the mere subjeotive unity of self 
we would encounter if the transcendental unity of apperception did not 
17It appears that the fact that transcendental object cannot be 
intuited is what leads to the general interpretation that it is equi-
valent to thing-in-itself, which could be intuited only by an intellec-
tual intuition. The fact is that transcendental object = x could not 
be intuited at all even by an intellectual intuition, if such were 
possible, because transcendental object is the necessary unity of all 
possible appearances in one experience. As such it is thought by 
reason as the sale ground of the objectivity of all possible appearances. 
18A108_9 (137). 19A109-10 (131-8). 
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include its objective grounding in transcendental object eX. Kant 
actually says: 
This relation is nothing but the necessary unity of con-
sciousness, and therefore also of the synthesi~ of the mani-
fold, through a common function of the mind, Li.e. transcendental 
unity of apperception] which combines it in one representation. 
Since this unity must be regarded as necessary ~ priori--
otherwise knowledge would be without an object--the relation 
to ~ transcendental object, that is, the objective reality of 
our empirical knowledge, rests on the transcendental law, that 
all appearances, in so far as through them objects are to be 
given to us, must stand under those ~ priori rules of synthet-
ical unity whereby the interrelating of these appearances in 
empirical intuition is alone possible. In other words, appear-
ances in experience must stand under the conditions of the 
necessary unity of apperception, just as in mere intuition 
they must be subject to the formal conditions of space and 
timeo 20 
We recognize the impossibility of ever actually accomplishing a 
total ~~hesis of the total manifold in intuition, both as regards to 
21 
space and time, and thus the impossibility of applying categories to 
either the possible total synthesis in the intuition of self (this the 
illusion of paralogism), or of the non-self (this is the dialectical 
illusion of antinomy). What is more, we recognize that our ~ of 
a total unity of consciousness has valid ob,jective employment only as 
applied to the possible totality of synthesis in the manifold of all 
intuition (both of inner and of outer sense). 
Thus the self as encountered in the transcendental Uhity of apper-
ception re~ains forever unknown as a total objective unity even though 
20A109_110 (131-8). Underlining supplied for emphasis. 
21 This becomes explicitly patent in Kant's formulation of The 
Ant inomie ~. 
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we recognize that every accomplished and possible synthesis of the 
manifold in intuition and every accomplished and possible application 
of the categories to this synthesis of the manifold in intuition must 
have the ground of its objective validity in this unity of the self 
encountered in the Transcendental unity of apperception. But this 
grounding is not recognized to be in an objectively necessary unity 
of all consciousness unless the unity of self is recognized to be 
involved in the total unity of a possible accomplished totality of all 
syntheses of all ~ manifold in. intuition, regarding time ~ space, 
to which ~ ~ of complete, utter and total unity of object is applied. 
This total unity of object is transcendental object. But since this 
possible accomplished totality of synthesis in all intuition patently 
will never be completed, the objectivity of our idea of this unity 
cannot ever be applied to an accomplished corresponding synthesis in 
intuition. Thus the idea of total object (as possibly given in the 
possible total synthesis of intuition in ~ time and space), though 
validly applied to a possible totality of experience, is not applied 
to an accomplished totality. Thus the object remains not knowledge, 
22 
i.e., unknown, i.e., = x, i.e., Transcendental object = x. This object 
22A108_111 (136-38). H. J. Paton observes that the fact that we are 
~ot at any moment aware of all appearances of all objects does not alter 
the fact tllat every given appearance must be capable of being combined in 
one consciousness with all other appearances; cf. Kant's Metaphysics of 
~perience (New Yorkl Macmillan, 1936), II, 459. This entire passage, 
~p. 437-475, is a profitable exposition of Transcendental Deduction. 
Cf. Graham Bird, Kant's Theorf of Knowledge (New York: The Humanities 
Wress, 1962), pp. 4-5, 17. Bra-observes that appearances do not repre-
sent things in themselves but rather represent transcendental object. 
But he does not develop this statement. 
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is something over and above the unknown objective ~ as encountered 
in the transcendental unity of apperception. This unknown self, as an 
object, is included in the totality of object in ~ intuition, both 
inner and outer. The unity of consciousness of self, in and of itself, 
is not yet a validly grounded encounter of the self as a necessary 
unity. To be a necessary unity, i.e. and objective necessity possibly23 
given in a possible totality of inner sense intuition it must be thought 
in relation to the ~ of a complete totality of sense intuition, both 
as regards inner sense and as regards outer sense. Thus Kant says, 
"The possibility, indeed the necessity, of these categories rests .2!l 
the relation in which our entire sensibility, and with it ~ possible 
appearances, stand to original apperception. 1I24 
Furthermore he says that the thorough going affinity of appearances 
is easily explainable by the fact that "ill possible appearances, as 
representations, belong to the totality of a possible self-consciousness:(. 
This self-consciousness is neoessarily a unity and a priori certain. 
Furthermore, it "~ enter into the synthesis of ill ~ manifold .Q.f. 
appearances ••• ,~6Kant has again pointed out the intentional nature 
of the transcendental unity of apperception; it involves not only unity 
23Note that the unity of self as an object can never be actually 
given in an accomplished intuition due to the impossibility of ever 
aotually intuiting the totality of time itself. 
24A111 (139). Underlining supplied for emphasis. 
25A113 (139-40). Underlining supplied for emphasis. 
26A114 (140). 
57 
or identity of the conscious subject, but also a necessary synthetic 
relation to the possible totality of synthesis in the manifold of all 
possible appearances. The transcendental unity of apperception can 
thus ground the objective reality of our empirical knowledge of objects 
because its own objectivity is grounded in "transcendental object - XII. 
Thus Kant is not succumbing to any radical subjectivism when he 
says that nature directs itself according to our subjective ground of 
apperception, since this "subjective" ground is also "trans';subjective ll 
in that the transcendental unity of apperception as a necessary unity 
includes and has its objectivity grounded in transcendental object. 
Kant re-iterates and enlarges these very same points in Section , 
of the A Deduction. 
There must ••• be an objective ground • 
rests the possibility, nay the necessity, of a 
to all appearances ••• This objective ground 
ation of appearances I entitle their affinity. 
to be found save in the principle of the unity 
in respect of all knowledge which ~ 1£ belong 
ing to this principle all appearances, without 
must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that 
to the unity of apperception.27 
• • upon which 
law that extends 
of all associ-
It is nowhere 
of apperception, 
to me. Accord-
exception, 
they conform 
The bipolar involvement of the subject in the transcendental unity 
of apperception is further made evident when Kant statesl 
The abiding and unchanging 'I' (pure apperception) forms 
the correlate 2! ~ £££ representations in so far as it is 1£ 
be at ~ possible that we should become conscious of them.28 
27A122 (145)0 Underlining supplied for emphasis. 
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Kant also states that the necessary unity of nature could not be 
an a priori certain unity in the connection of appearances 
• • • if there were not subjective grounds of such 
unity contained ~ priori in the original cognitive powers 
of the mind, and if these subjective conditions ••• 
were not !i ~ ~ time objectively valid. 29 
Finally the bipolar involvement in transcendental (necessary) unity 
of apperception again becomes apparent in the "Summary" of the A ~-
uction. Kant st&tes that the 
••• unity of possible consciousness &lso constitutes 
the form of all knowledge of objects; thro:qgh'it the 
manifold is thought as belonging to a single object. 30 
The "single object" is evidently a reference to tr&nscendental object, 
the concept of which is one and the same in meaning throughout all our 
knowledge. 
D. Transcendental Object and the 
Second Edition Deduction 
It could be surmised that Kant dropped his doctrine of transcend en-
tal object in the Second Edition Deduction because he found it to be 
untenable. We must say, with what we feel to be much greater justifi-
cation, that Kant dropped his use of the term transcendental object in 
the ~ Deduction, but developed the very same doctrine without the term-
inology which may have been confusing in the First Edition of the ££i-
29A125_6 (147). Underlining supplied for emphasis. 
30A129 (149-50). 
59 
31 
tigue. The fact is that Kant extensively uses the terminology of 
Ed Ot 32 transcendental object later in the Second 1 ion. But he does so 
only after he feels that his doctrine as it is promulgated in the 
Paralogisms will safe guard the doctrine of transcendental object from 
being misunderstood to be a doctrine of an unknown thing-in-itself 
(noumenon) considered as an objective correlate of a noumenal self. 
The only inconsistency regaraing transcendental object in the two 
editions of the Critique is the change of terminology. The doctrine 
remains the same. The terminology apparently was changed in the 
Second Edition to prevent apparent doctrinal inconsistencies from 
arising in the mind of his readers. 
33 
In the B Deduction Kant again points out that the Understanding 
is the faculty of knowledge. Knowledge is knowledge of an object. 
310n this point see T. D. Weldon. Kant's Critique of ~ Reason 
(Oxford a 1958), p. 293. Weldon says that it seems inconceivable that 
simply because the chief passages of A, in which transcendental object 
appeared, were dropped in B, should cause it to be explicitly identified 
with thing in itself, or should cause us to think that almost all mention 
of it is suppressed in B. 
32Kant allows the term to remain at B236=A191 in the Second Analogy. 
It also remains in the Amphiboly at A211-18=B333-34 and at A288=B344. 
Smith consistently condemns the appearance of the term in these places 
as a failure on Kant's part to properly recast the Second Edition. N. 
K. Smith's Commentary, pp. 214-15, 412. We present our views on the 
appearance of the term in these places in our chapters on the Analogies 
and the Amphiboly. The term does not regain extensive employment until 
the Transcendental Dialectic where the Paralogisms provide sufficient 
clarification that transcendental object cannot mean any noumenal entity. 
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Object is "that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intui-
tion is united".34 
Unification of all representations demands a necessary unity of 
consciousness. Thus, necessary unity of consciousness alone constitutes 
the relation of representations to an object. The necessary synthetio 
unity of consciousness is an objective condition of all knowledge. 35 
The term transcendental object is not employed here, but the 
transcendental unity of apperception is entitled objective, and is 
distinguished from a mere subjective unity of consciousness, which is 
36 
a determination of inner sense only. This distinction is equivalent 
to the statement in A that transcendental object :: x is the sole ground 
of the objectivity of the self as encountered in transcendental unity 
of apperception, and has to do not only with the syntheses of inner 
sense (time), but of outer sense (space) also; that only the pure con-
cept of transcendental object can confer objective reality upon all our 
empirical concepts in general. 37 
The Categories are again functions of judgement, in which the 
~anifold of intuition is necessarily subjected to the original unity 
38 
of apperception. 
The necessary synthetic unity of apperce~tion, as distinct from 
mere inner sense (i.e., as grounded in and included in the idea of trans-
37cfo A109-10 (137-8). 
cendental object = x), 
••• is the source of all combination, applies to the 
mani!old of intuitions in general, and in the gu~se 
of Lunter dem Nameri/the categories, prior to all 
Laccomplilihey sensible intuition, to objec.ts in 
general Las objects of possible experienci/39 
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In the transcendental unity of appercept ion, .as necessary and 
objective, I am conscious of myself not as ~ appearance (that regards 
my inner intuition only) nor as I am in myself (this would be the object 
of an intellectual intuition, i.e. intuition of noumenon). This con-
sciousness is a representation, a thougbt, E.2..t ~ intuition. It is an 
idea of the total unity of the spontaneous apylication of unity to the 
possible totality of the manifold in intuition. Since it is an idea 
which applies to appearances, at least possible appearances in sense 
intuition, it is quite patently not a concept of thing-in-itself (noume-
ll.QJl). Nevertheless it is not knowledge of an object. In order for 
this idea to be knowledge, such a total synthesis of all the manifold 
of intuition would have to be actually accomplished by the subject. 
But we quickly recognize that time, the limiting condition of inner sense, 
allows us only to intuit the combination of the manifold according to 
the relations of time. Kant's consistent doctrine is that we cannot 
intuit time itself, i.e., the totality of time, thus a totally ~ 
39B154 (166). This seems to be quite close in meaning to Paton's 
observations regarding B141 (cf. A12~where Paton finds that understanding 
implies that in all judgement there is an a priori synthesis. H. J. 
Paton. Kant's Metaphysics £f Experience (New York: Macmillan, 1936), 
p. 515; cf., pp. 469-71, 510-513. 
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complished synthesis of the manifold of intuition remains always a task 
40 
to be accomplished. Thus our idea of a total and necessary unity of 
the self never becomes knowledge because it can never be applied to an 
accomplished total synthesis in all intuition. But the idea as expanded 
to include the necessary unity of all experience, is validly applied 
1£ ~ possible total synthesis in all intuition, and thus it is validly 
objective. What this object is in itself (note we say object in itself, 
not thing-in-itself or noumenon) we cannot~. Kant could, if he 
felt it would not confuse his readers, very consistently call this 
unknown object transcendental object ~~, in which the ~ priori objective 
validity of the categories is ultimately grounded. The doctrine pre-
sented here41 is the very same as that of the A Deduction minus the 
employment of the term "transcendental object:: x." 
Probably the most destructive effect following from a misunderstand-
ing of Kant's doctrine of transcendental object is the vacuum it leaves 
in one's interpretation of the scope and meanin~ of the Deduction. No 
K. Smith says "The concept of an object consists in the thought of a 
manifold so determined in its specific order and groupings as to be 
interpretable in terms of the categories of substance and causality.,,42 
This is of course a thoroughly incomplete idea of object for Kant. Smith 
~oes go on to point out that the deduction rests upon an interpretation 
4
0 0n this point see G. Bird, ££. cit., p. 79. 
41cf. B154-159 (166-169). 
4 2N• K. Smith. Commentary, p. 250. 
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of the unity of apperception and that valid application of categories 
to empirical objects rests upon relation of intuitions of these empir-
44 
ical objects to the unity of apperception. Nevertheless, he appar-
ently does not think that objectivity ~ ~ rests upon the transcen-
dental unity of apperception as it is objective, i.e. necessary, in the 
total unity of experience of objects, i.e. transcendental object = x, 
i.e. the possibility of the subject's total and complete regress of 
synthesis of a~l appearances in experience. We feel, however, that 
there is, for Kant, a possible complete experience to which the idea of 
totality of object is properly applied, but an experience never actually 
complete. Since the total experience always remains a task to be ac-
complished the transcendental object must always remain an II .. x", i.e. 
remain unknown. This does not, however, prevent the idea of totality 
of object from being validly applied to a possible total experience. 
Thus, as an idea, it is a valid guarantee of the a priori validity of 
the application of categories to objects in experience. 
E. ~ Analytic of Principles--Confirmation of the Bole 
of Transcendental Object in Transcendental Deduction 
In the Principles ££ Pure Understanding Kant points out that it is 
the very possibility of experience that gives objective reality to the 
a priori mode of knowledge. The possibility of experience, in turn, 
rests on Ita synthesis according' to concepts of an object of appearances 
in general Li.e. categOrie.:u.1I45 
43~. p. 251. 44~. p. 252. 
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But in addition, this synthesis, this objeotive knowledge must 
••• fit into ••• context according to rules of a 
completely interconnected (possibl~consciousness ••• 
conform to the transcendental and necessary unity of 
apperception • • • Apart from this relation46 slnthetic 
a priori principles are completely impossible,4"( LThey 
are impossibl!!l because they then have no third some-
thing, namely pure object, in which the synthetic unity 
can ground its concepts' objective reality.48 
Kant goes on to say that synthetic a priori jUdgements are possible 
••• when we relate the formal conditions of a priori 
intuition, the synthesis of imagination and the necessary 
unity of this synthesis in a transcendental apperception, 
to a possible empirical knowledge in general. We then 
assert that conditions of the possibility ~ experience 
in general are likewise conditions of the possibilit~ of 
~ objects £i experience, and that for this reason they 49 
have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgement. 
461.e. their conformity 1£, and grounding 1n., the transcendental 
and necessary unity of consciousness. 
47A156-57=B195-96 (193). Kant's text continues here without any 
break, except a comma, into the next sentence which is my own trans-
lation, of the text as it appears at Werke, p. 200. It is important 
to emphasize the unity of thought in this passage rather than break 
it into two sentences which could appear to be not very Closely united. 
4811weil sie kein Drittes, namlich reinen Gegenstand haben, an 
dem die synthetische Einheit ihrer Begriffe objective Realitat dartun 
konnte." (Werke,p. 200.) Compare (193) where Smith reads "keinen 
Gegenstand" with Grillo for "re inen Gegenstand". "Pure object", as 
here employed by Kant, has immediate and direct reference to the fact 
that it is a necessary unity of apperception which grounds the very 
possibility of synthetic a priori principles. This necessity must 
rest on a third something, namely kure object, i.e., transcendental 
object = x. 
This is very clearly a formulation of the same doctrine which 
was called the doctrine of transcendental object in the! Deduction 
and which was again formulated in the ~ Deduction without the use of 
the term transcendental object. The very possibility of experience 
rests upon the valid application of the categories to the manifold of 
appearances in general. This valid application in turn is grounded in 
a proper conformity to the transcendental and necessary unity of con-
sciousness. This unity, as necessary, i.e., objective, is grounded 
in a third something, namely, pure object. This pure object is 
patently identical with transcendental object = x. 50 
In summary, in Chapter III we have seen the textual evidence to 
support the view that transcendental object is at the very core of the 
Transcendental Deduction in the grounding of the objectivity of our 
knowledge. We found (a) that the problem of the Transcendental Deduc-
~ (namely, how can we justify the synthetic application of the cate-
gories to the manifold of intuition) is ultimately solved in terms of 
the doctrine of transcendental object. We also discovered that Kant, 
in the argument for this justification in the First Edition Deduction, 
found (b) that the general synthetic unity and necessity of object as 
such is related to both the unity of apperception and the transcendental 
object in a complex and necessary manner. The synthetic thinking of 
unity and necessity into the manifold of appearances, i.e., the appli-
50Cf • our discussion above of the text at A108-9 where the pure 
concept of transcendental object is said to be the sale guarantee of 
~he objective reality of our empirical concepts. 
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cation of the categories by the understanding, the knowing of objects, 
rests upon some kind of synthetic unity in the very manifold of appear-
ances. But this synthetic unity in the manifold of a~pearances is gen-
erated in accordance with a rule which a priori necessitates the repro-
duction of the manifold in the knower, and, at the same time, renders 
the category (in which the manifold is unified as a known object) 
51 
possible. This rule, this unity of rule, limits the manifold to 
conditions which make the unity of apperception possible. 52 The idea 
of this unity of rule is the idea of the object = x in general, i.e., 
the transcendental object = x. We saw Kant go further, saying (c) 
that the transcendental object makes the transcendental unity of apper-
ception an objectively necessary unity. Thus the genecal synthetic 
unity and necessity of the objects of our knowledge actually rests 
on the unity of apperception in so far as that unity is a necessary 
unity. The general unity and necessity of the objects, as such, of our 
knowledge rests indirectly and ultimately on the transcendental object, 
since the transcendental object ultimately grounds the necessity of the 
transcendental unity of apperception. 
It will be profitable for us, at this point, to evaluate the second 
and third general categories of commentators outlined in Chapter I. It 
seems that each is correot, to a degree, and incorrerit, to a degree. 
In the present chapter we have seen (in sections B and C) that transcen-
51 Cf • our discussion above re: A105 (135) on p. 49 of this thesis. 
dental object is involved in the necessary unity of the subject, and 
yet, also some kind of correlate of subjectivity. On the one hand, 
the unity of apperception is not properly the transcendental unity of 
apperception unless grounded in, or possibly even constituted partially 
of (as we noted on p. 53 of this thesis), the transcendental object. 
On the other hand, Kant definitely talks of the transcendental object 
as a correlate of apperception or unity of subject. Kant's authentic 
doctrine seems to demand, on the one hand, that transcendental object 
be intimately associated or bound up with the unity of subject inap-
~ perception as an objectively necessary unity of subject, but on the 
':Y 
other hand, that it also be a non-subjective correlate of subjectivity 
involved with the trans-subjective totality of appearances in order 
to guarantee real objects for the knower. 
In this chapter Vie have also seen evidence in the First Edition 
Deduction that it is in the transcendental object that Kant ultimately 
grounds the necessary unity of consciousness, the transcendental unity 
of apperception, objectivity as such, and thus, the synthetic application 
of the categories to the manifold of experience by the understanding. 
We have further seen that Kant (d) did not retract the doctrine 
of transcendental object in the second Edition Deduction even though 
he does not employ the term "transcendental object". On the contrary, 
Kant develops the argument of the Seoond Edition Deduction in sub-
stantially the same manner as he did in the First Edition. This role 
of the doctrine of transcendental objeot in the Deduotion of both editions 
(e) is borne out by oonfirmatory evidence in ~ Analytic Of Principles, 
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which is substantially the same for both editions. 
Now that we have seen the function of transcendental object in the 
Analytic, it becomes our task to examine its role in the Dialectic, 
where its relationship to the illusion of pure reason and the resolution 
of pure reason's self-conflict should become apparent. A better under-
standing of the role of transcendental object in the Dialectic will 
help us understand better the critical philosophy of Kant and the role 
of the transcendental object in that philosophy. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE OF TRANSCENDENTAL OBJECT IN 
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC 
In Chapter III Vie saw evidence that the doctrine of transcendental 
object plays a crucial role in the very core of the Analytic, the Trans-
cendental Deduction. 
It is now our task to examine the role of the transcendental object 
in the Transcendental Dialectic where Kant employs it explicitly and 
extensively in both the First and Second Editions. We must discover 
what role, if any, the transcendental object plays in Kant's resolution 
of reason's natural conflict with itself. We must also determine whether 
the resolution of this conflict enables us to understand better the very 
nature of Kant's critical philosophy and the role of transcendental 
object in that philosophy. We will approach these general questions by 
clearly defining the exact nature of the illusion in (a) The Paralogisms, 
(b) the mathematical antinomies, and (c) the dynamical antinomies. In 
each of these cases, we will also carefully determine exactly how Kant 
mitigates and resolves the illusion. 
A. The Paralogisms--the Illusion of Objectivity in the 
Subject's Synthesis of Thought 
If we were to assume that in the Paralogisms Kant believed himself 
to have proved that the self as a self-conscious being is a geninely 
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noumenal existence, we would quite consistently hold that it is for 
this reason that Kant was forced to hold that the categories were 
"inadequate to express its real determinate nature.,,1 But Kant gives 
a different reason for the inadequacy of the categories here. 
Smith, in his Commentary incorporates his interpretation of the 
Transcendental Deduction into his exposition of the significance of the 
2 
ParalogisM· Smith points out that the key to the proper treatment 
of the illusion of paralogism is first supplied by the results of the 
Transcendental Deduction. Thus his own interpretation of the full 
results of the Deduction causes him to criticise Kant for ll2i showing 
that "the Paralogisms rests upon a failure to distinguish between ap-
3 pearance and reality." Smith immediately goes on directly to criticise 
Kant for tracing the cause of the fallacy of the first three Paralogisms 
"solely to a failure to distinguish between the logical and real appli-
cation of the categories".4 
The fact is that there is no need for Kant to ask his readers to 
distinguish between "appearances and reality" to point out properly 
the illusion of the Paralogisms. We have indicated above that the 
illusion of the Paralogisms is the application of the categories to the 
possible total regress in the synthesis of intuition of the self. This 
is a purely logical employment of categories. It is not a real employ-
1N• K. Smith, Commentary, p. 328. See the entire treatment on pp. 
327-29. 
2~., pp. 260 ff. This transfer is also apparent at pp. 455 ff. 
3Smith, ~. cit., p. 457. 4Ibid • 
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ment; it is, in fact, an impossible employment, since the categories 
oan be applied only to accomplished syntheses in intuition. What is 
more, to apply the categories to the unity of consciousness ~ ~ object-
~, i.~., necessary unity, is to force the category to determine the 
transcendental object, that which grounds its very own valid employment. 
All this patently is an impossibility in the system of critical phil-
osophy. Kant's procedure in the Paralogisms is absolutely consistent 
with his mature critical philosophy and its central doctrine of truns-
cendental object. 
Kant, as we have seen, does not consider a noumenal existence to 
be an object at all for pure speculative reason if reason is maintaining 
its proper critical employment. Any noumenal aspects of the self are 
irrelevant to the question of why the categories cannot in any way be 
applied to the objective existence of the self as encountered in the 
transcendental unity of apperception. Smith, however, is forced to 
state: liThe patchwork character of the Critique, the artificial nature 
of the connections between its various parts, is nowhere more evident 
5 
than in this section on the paralogisms." 
It should be evident to us that the categories are neither adequate 
nor applicable to the self as a self conscious being. First the cate-
gories are limited to distinct aspects of reality such as substanfe or 
cause. Any given category is thus limited in its application, at least 
5Smith, ibid., p. 457. Further evidence of Smith's constant holding 
~o this interpretation is found in his discussion of the "Notion of Self 
las a Necessary Idea of Reason" at pp. 473-8. 
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by the aspects of reality to v,chich the other categories apply. We 
could therefore not find anyone category adeguate to apply to the unity 
of the self as a self conscious being, who is aware of his relation to 
!ll realit~. Secondly, the a priori validity of the categories as 
applicable to any object is grounded a priori in the transcendental unity 
of apperception ~ objective, i.e., as grounded in and involved with 
transcendental object. It would be absurd for the category to be able 
to express the real determinate nature of that which makes possible the 
category's very application. The a priori validity of the category's 
employment is itself grounded in the necessary unity of consciousness 
in experience. If the category were able, in turn, to determine the 
ground of its valid employment, it could also extend itself to any kind 
of possible object totally independent of any kind of intuition. This 
would in fact place an impardonable and destructive fallacy at the very 
heart of critical philosophy. 
Kant, in fact, again displays his thoroughgoing and consistent hold-
ing to the doctrine of transcendental unity of apperception as objective, 
6 i.e., as grounded in and included in transcendental object. 
The natural illusion of the Paralogism, like all illusion of pure 
reason consists in treating the subjective condition of thinking as 
7 being knowledge of the object. In the Paralogisms pure reason occupies 
itself only with the ~.bsolute totality of the synthesis of the subjective 
6 A396-404; cf. B406-411. 
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conditions of a thought in general. Herein pure reason occupies itself 
solely with that condition which is unoonditioned. 
Since, in thought in general, all relation to any object is disre-
garded, the synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general is ~ 
objective at~. The illusion of the Paralogisms is to mistake this 
pure synthesis of thOUg~lt within sub ject for a synthet ic representation 
8 
of an object. 
Nevertheless, the "I" which accompanies ill thought, the "I" in 
the proposition "I think", II represented ~ ~ object which I think 
as the object "I" along with its unconditioned unity. But I cannot 
!mill!. what thi!;l "I" is because in this highly general problem there is 
no intuition to which any a priori knowledge could correspond. yet 
the illusion that we are able to apply attributes such as subst~nce to 
this tlI" persists even though it now has been recognized to be highly 
9 
suspect. 
But we see the error in the application of such attrubutes when 
we see the origin of these attributes. They are nothing other than 
the pure categories, which only think unity into sense representations 
8A391-98 (362). Kant's statement here that the synthesis of the 
conditions of a thought in general is not objective at all reinforces 
our conviction that objectivity cannot"b"e grounded sOI'ery-in the unity 
of the thinking subjeot, but rather in the necessary transcendental 
unity of apperception which derives its necessity in its synthetic re-
lationship to tha "trans-subjective" possible totality of synthesis in 
intuition of phenomenal object--in its relationship to the "transcendental 
objeot = x". 
14 
to determine an object for them. These attributes cannot be applied to 
the III" because there is no object given in intuition which would allow 
the category to yield the concept of an object. Such predicates as 
"simple" must be given in the intuition of the simple thing itself .!!!. 
10 
appearance. If such predicates are not SO given, there is n£ knowledge 
whatsoever of object. 
Thus when we say that the soul is simple substance, and have no 
intuition to apply this concept to, we are merely saying it is a 
subject in itself not the predicate of anything else, nothing ~.11 
The natural illusion that the thinking self knows the absolutely 
unified self through those very categories which express absolute unity 
is due to the following reason: 
Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility 
of the categories; which on their part represent nothing 
but the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, in so far 
as the manifold has unity in apperception. Self conscious-
ness in general is therefore the representation of that 
which is the condition of all unity, and itself is uncon-
ditioned. We can thus say of the thinking 'I' (the soul), 
which regards itself as substance, as simple, as numerically 
identical at all times, and as the correlate of all exist-
ence, from which all other existence must be inferred, that 
it does not know itself through the categories, but knows 
the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute 
unity of apperception,12 and so through itself. Now it is, 
10A399-400 (363-64). Note that Kant speaks here of "the thing 
itself ll and lithe thing itself in appearance ll • He says nothing about 
a thing-in-itself (noumenon) here. 
11 A400-01 (364). 
12This absolute unity must be that which is grounded in pure object, 
transcendental object. See our discussion above regarding A10B-9 and 
A15B-9=B191. 
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indeed, very evident that I cannot know as an object, 
that which I must presuppose in order to know any object, 
and that the determining self (the thought) is disting-
uished from the self that is to be determined (the thinking 
subject) in the same way as knowledge is distinguished from 
its object. Nevertheless there is nothing more natural and 
more misleading than the illusion which leads us to regard 
the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a perceived unity 
in the subject of these thoughts. We might call it the 
subreption of the hypostatised consciousness. 13 
A paralogism such as simplicity or substantiality is thus the 
result of the illusion that we have, in fact, Eerceived the unity of 
subject; whereas we have, in fact, only represented this unity as an 
object belonging quite validly to a Eossible total eXEerience, which 
remains forever a task to be completed. Thus, in the Second Edition 
formulation, Kant finds that when we recognize that the self unity is 
not any noumenal existence, then critical philosophy stands utterly 
unshaken. 
Smith, however criticizes Kant for mistakenly believing himself 
to have proved the self-conscious self to be a nournenal existence, 
at B422 of the Paralogisms. Smith contends that Kant's position here 
is open to criticism on all sides, that Kant introduces a hitherto 
unrecognized !.£!:m..2.f. existence, an alternative reality which is neither 
14 
appearance nor thing-in-itself. 
The fact is that Kant's position here is no different than we have 
seen him formulating throughout the Critigue. Kant is, at this point, 
returning to the language of the First Edition. He expects his reader 
14N• K. Smith, QE. cit., pp. 330-31. 
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to be prepared to understand his employment of these terms without 
prejudicing the proper understanding of the critical character of the 
entire Critique. 
Kant points out, at this point, that rational psychology is the 
result of mistaking the unity of consciousness, which underlies the 
categories, for an intuition of the subject ~ object, and thus 
applying the category of substance to this unity. Such an employment 
of the categories is thoroughly invalid because the unity of subject 
is in itself a prereguisite for the application of the categories. 
Kant actually says that 
• • • the "I think" expresses an indeterminate empirical 
intuition, i.e., perception, ••• An indeterminate per-
ception here signifies only something real that is 
given, given indeed to thought in general, and so not 
as appearance, nor as thing 1n itself (noumenon), but 
as something that actually Lin der tat (Werke. p. 356) 
might better be translated "as a matter of fact2 exists, 
and which in the proposition, 'I think' is denoted ••• I 
do not mean to say ••• that the 'I' in this proposition 
is an empirical repre~entation. On the contrary, it is 
purely 1ntellectual list sie rein intellektuell (Werke, 
p. 3561/; because belonging to thought in general. With-
out some empirical representution to supply material for 
thought, the actus, 'I think t, would not indeed, take 
place; but the empirical is only the condition of the 
application or of the employment, of the pure intellectual 
Lintellektuellen, (Werke. p. 35617 faculty.15 
Thus ue see that the absolute unity of apperception which is a 
purely intellectual representation does validly apply to an object ~hich 
is given in an intuition, an indeterminate empirical intuition. It is 
not given as an actually accomplished total regress of synthesis of 
15note "a" B422-23 (318). 
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appearances in experience. As a representation it is ~ empirical, but 
purely intellectual. But it has objective validity as an ~ because 
it applied to a possible totality of regress in synthesis of appearances 
in experience. The absolute unity and identity of the "I" is objectively 
valid ~ ~ because II ..!E. grounded in ~ included ill lli "transcen-
16 dental object = x." 
This "I" cannot be a substance because it is not an accomplished 
synthesis of appearance in experience. Thus no category can validly 
be applied to it. 
This "I" cannot be ~ appearance because then it would be merely 
manifold with no unity. In such a situation, understanding would not 
be able to function at all; any and all knowledge would be an impos-
sibility. 
This "I" cannot be a thing-in-itself (noumenon) because it must 
ultimately be referred to possible experience, and because it is in 
17 
fact the sine qua ~ of all unity in appearances, and of all valid 
objective necessity. This "I" is referred to possible experience in 
ill representation of ~ possible total wholeness, .Q.!. completion, of 
the regress in synthesis of ~ appearances in experience. It is 
included in (or includes) and grounded in that third something, pure 
object, the "transcendental object == x". 
16Thus to say "transcendental object == x" is simply an object 
relate to subject in the transcendental unity of apperception does 
seem to be quite accurate; See N. K. Smith, Commentary, p. 322. 
17cf • A. C. Ewing, ~. £li., pp. 40-71. 
cor-
not 
. ' 
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Kant has, ill ~ Second Edition, formulated this doctrine in its 
utter fullness. The doctrine is certainly not supressed here, it is 
presented with far greater clarity and force than it was in the First 
Edi tion Pi3.ralogisms. We must understund Kant properly here if we are 
to fully understand Kant's mature critical doctrine. 
Bo The Mathematical Antinomies--the Illusion of Given-
ness in the Totality of the Phenomenal World 
Regarding each employment of the term transcendental object in the 
Antinomies, Smith saySI 
In all these cases there is not the least uncertainty 
as to its denotation. It is taken as equivalent to the 
thing in itself, and is expounded as a necessary ingre-
dient in the consciousness of our subjective represen-
tations as noumenally grounded. 18 
We are now in a position to see that this interpretation, which is repre-
sentative of those who identify transcendental object with thing-in-
itself, is entrapped in transcendental illusion regarding transcendental 
object. 
The term transcendental object appears at A478-9=B506-7 (431-2)0 
Kant points out that it is only regarding cosmological objects that 
transcendental philosophy is justified to demand a sufficient answer 
19 
7' bearing on the constitution of the object. This is so because cosmo-
18N• K. Smith, ~. £!l., p. 215. 
19A478~B506 (431-32). Kant argues that transcendental philosophy 
~as not justified in even asking the question of what might be the con-
stitution of the object in the Paralogisms. In the Paralogisms the 
question referred to the transcendental subject of all inner appearances. 
This subject is not itself an appearance and is not given as an object. 
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logical ideas alone .£!!l "presuppose their object, and the empirical 
20 
synthesis required .f.£!:. ~ concept, ~ being given." The question 
then arising out of cosmological ideas refers only to whether or not 
this synthesis can be carried to utter completion, so as to contain 
absolute totality of object, a totality which is no longer empirical 
since it cannot actually be given in any experience. Nevertheless, 
such a thing is an object of possible experience, not a thing-in-itself. 
Thus the answer to the transcendent cosmological question, the question 
of llilmtinomies, must be found in the idea. Reason cannot push its 
responsibility onto the unknown object Ltranscendental object = !l 
because our only question "is as to what lies in the idea, to which the 
21 
empirical synthesis can be expected merely to be approximate." 
Since it is this anticipated given object which is "transcendental 
object = x", and since this object can only be expected to approximate 
The categories in no way met with the conditions required for their 
application in the Paralogisms. There ~ ~ object 1£ be perceived. 
Thus the question as to what the object constitution might be Was 
entirely "null and void". A478-9=B506-7 (432), especially note "a"o 
20A479=B507 (432). 
21" ••• sondern was in der Idee liegt, der sich die empirische 
Synthesis bloss nahern soll". A479=B507 (Werke, p. 452). Smith's 
translation "as to what lies in the idea, to which the empirical 
Synthesis can do no more than merely approximate" is correct here. 
However, I wish to bring out more forcefully the impact of "bloss nahern 
solI". Kant is here thinking of the expectation or anticipation of 
the given object in a possible total regress of all appearances in 
intuit ion. 
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22 
cosmological ideas, not to correspond exactly to them, our question 
regarding cosmological objects, the objects of ~ Antinomies, must be 
found entirely within the cosmological ideas. 23 
Here we see that Kant explicitly states that transcendental object 
is not thing-in-itself, that it remains unknown, even though it applies 
to intuition, because the empirical synthesis can never be accomplished. 
Kant's meaning is so intensely compressed in this short passage at 
A478-79=B506-7 that we cannot possibly understand him if we do not 
understand his authentic doctrine of transcendental object which under-
lies his discussion here. 
The term transcendental object appaars again at A494-95=B522-24 
(441-2). Here Kant says that we may entitle the purely intelligible 
24 _ 
ground of appearances in general "transcendental object" Lnot to 
25 
posit a thing in itselfl, but simply to have something to correspond 
22 Note that we have hit upon the root of the dialectical illusion 
of cosmological ideas, the employment of understanding contrary to its 
vocation in forcing "objects, i.e., possible intuitions, to conform to 
concepts or ideas, not concepts to possible intuitions, on which alone 
their objective validity rests." A289=B345 (294). Cf. our discussion 
of this text in our chapter on ~ Amphibolx. 
23A479=B507 (432). 
24Smith translates Ursache (Werke, p. 462) as cause. 
25 
See Kant's immediately preceeding discussion at A493-4=B521-22 
(440-41)0 ". 0 • the objects of experience, then are never given in 
themselves, but only in experience, and have no existence outside IT,," 
(492=B521) "To call an appearance a real thing prior to our perceiving 
it, either means that in the advance of experience we must meet with 
such a perception, or it means nothing at all. For if we were speaking 
of a thing in itself, we could indeed say that it exists apart from 
relation to our senses and possible experience. But we are here speak-
ing of an appearance in space and time." (A493=B521-22). 
to sensibility as a receptivitYI 
If therefore I represent to myself all existing objects 
of the senses in all time and in all places, I do not 
set them in space and time (as beiUg there) prior to 
experience.; This. representation Li.e., transcendental 
object = !I is nothing but the thought o~6possible 
experience in its absolute completeness. 
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Kant certainly oan be no more explicit in his denial that transcendental 
obje6t is a thing-in-itself. 
He immediately goes on to explicitly state that it must remain 
unknown because empirical rules prevent him from completing this experi-
ence. 27 
If Kant's doctrine of transcendental object is misunderstood the 
very nature of antinomy and its solution is oversimplified, and thus, 
not properly understood. The fact that we merely disting-uish phenomenon 
from noumenon does not solve the antinomy, i.e., the unavoidable natural 
dialectical conflict of reason with itself. The distinction of phenom-
en on from noumenon simply eliminates the self contradiction of the uncon-
28 
ditioned and tells us that the unavoidable conflict of reason with 
itself is not an analytic, i.e., contradictory conflict, but rather a 
29 
synthetic, i.e., dialectic conflict. 
26A495=B523-4 (442). Contrast with Graham Bird's interpretation; 
Graham Bird, ££. £!i., pp. 68-70. 
27 
A496=B524 (442) the consistency of this doctrine with the doctrine 
of indeterminate perception at B422-23 is apparent. 
28cf • "Preface" Bxx (24)0 
29cf • Emile Boutroux, ~ Philosophie de Kant (ParisI Vrin, 1928), 
pp. 153-55. This passage in Kant may very well be the basis of Bella K. 
Milmed's contention that Kant introduced tbe problem of "bridging the 
82 
Thus, when we have merely distinguished between phenomenon and 
noumenon, vIe have not solved the ant inomies, we have merely avoided the 
analytical-contradictory opposition of the antinomies. Kant does not 
eschew the remaining task of critically solving the problem of dia-
lectical opposition in ~ Antinomies. 
An antinomy, i.e., an unavoidable natural conflict of reason with 
itself, rests on and arises from the dialectical (not analytic and 
contradictory) argument that if the conditioned is given then the entire 
30 
series is likewise given. 
This dialectical opposition of ~ Antinomies allows both thesis 
31 
and antithesis to be false. This is true because the world is not 
given as a thing-in-itself Lbut rather as a transcendental objec!7 and 
32 
~ is not therefore given as an object known to be either finite or infinite. 
If the opposition of thesis and antithesis were analytical, i.e., 
gap between the analytic and the synthetic, between logic and existence, 
to such an extent that the application of logic to the empirical world 
is possible." B. K. Milmed, Kant and Current Philosophical Issues 
(New York University Press, 19b1J, p. 22. Contrast her statement that 
noumenon, as object of intuitive understanding resembles transcendental 
object while the concept of a noumenon resembles the concept of a thing-
in-itself and that this is an attempt on Kant's part to attribute a 
existential character to transcendental object. cf., ~., pp. 221-22. 
31In the first two mathematical antinomies. In the case of the 
seoond two antinomies, which are dynamical,the case will be changed. 
32A504=B532 (447), A505=B533 (448). 
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contradictory, we would be assuming the world to be a thing-in-itself, 
which would remain even if we suspended either our accomplished limited 
regress, or our representation of a possible complete regress in the 
series of appearances. If this were the case, we could in no way resolve 
33 
an antinomy. 
But since we see that the world is not a thing-in-itself Ltor us 
at leasil we recognize the dialectical opposition of an antinomy, 
and see that the world exists neither as a finite nor as an infinite 
total object in itself known by us: 
It exists only in the empirical regress of the series 
of appearances, and is not to be met with as something 
in itself. If then, this series is always conditioned, 
and therefore can never be given as complete, the world 
is not an unconditioned whole, and does not exist as 
such a whole either of infinite or of finite magnitude. 34 
An antinomy is thus properly and fully resolved when we see that 
the world, as a complete and absolute totality (Le. transcendental 
object = x), cannot ever be known. It can, however, properly and validly 
be thought as an object, since our idea of the whole validly applies to 
the possible total accomplished regress in the synthesis of all the 
manifold of all appearances in intuition. The fact that the world 
totality can be thought validly makes antinomies unavoidable. 35 
35A505-6=B533-34 (448). Korner's exposition of the first two 
antinomies is generally quite lucid; cf. S. Korner, ~ (Baltimore: 
Penguin, 1955), pp. 113-117. But he does not give an important place 
to transcendental object in Kant's argument, and thus does not give a 
basic reason why the illusion, which gives rise to antinomies, is 
utterly unavoidable. He says that one way of resolving the antinomies 
84 
Kant explicitly formulates this complexity in the nature of the 
antinomies of pure reason in the Transcendental Doctrine £t Method 
when he states that the antinomies 
••• turned out to be only an apparent conflict, resting 
upon a misunderstanding. In accordance with the common 
prejudice, it took appearances as being things in them-
selves, and ~ reguired ~ absolute completeness £f 
their synthesis in the ~ ~ or ill ~ other (this being 
equally impossible in either way):-a demand which is ~ ~ 
ill. permissible ill respect £f appearances. There was, 
therefore, no real self-contradiction of reason in the 
propounding of two propositions, tl1at the series of appear-
ances given in themselves has an absolutely first beginning, 
and that this s~ries is ubsolutely and in itself without 
any beginning. 36 
Kant goes on to point out how greatly the problem of ~ Antinomies 
(this apparently applies to the first two) is to show that the apparent 
contradiction is a real contradiction following from the internally 
inconsistent assumption that an apvearance is a thing-in-itself, whereas 
the idea of completion of an unlimited process is that of a non phenomenon 
intelligible, or thing-in-itself. Ibid., pp. 114, 111. --
For Kant's own remarks on the valid employment of transcendental 
idea as opposed to their invalid transcendent employment due to 
illusion see paragraph no. 45 of the Prolegomena (pp. 96-91 of Lucas' 
translation). 
Kant says here that reason impels the understanding to wander 
beyond its own boundaries into the field of mere beings of the under-
standing. Reason demands completion of the chain of conditions and 
thus drives the understanding out of its own sphere to represent objects 
of experience in a series so far extended that no experience can com-
prehend it. These transcendental ideas are not aiming at extravagant 
concepts, but merely at the unlimited usa of concepts in experience. 
But the unavoidable illusion here is the further demand on the part 
of reason that this object beyond the comprehension of experience be 
known. This entices the understanding into a transcendent employment, 
to seek noumena which are quite outside possible experience, quite 
outside the conditions of experience. 
36A740=E168 (594). Underlining supplied for emphasis. 
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differs from the problem of ~ Ideal of pure reason (Supreme Being 
vs. no Supreme Being) and ~ Paralogism of pure reason (abiding unity 
of soul va. transitoriness). He states: 
• • • in these cases the understanding has to deal only 
with things-ill-themselves and not with appearances ••• 
There would indeed be a real conflict, if pure reason had 
anything to say on the negative side which amounted to 
a positive ground for its negative contentions.37 
L. Vi. Beck observes that after Kant solves the antinomy, "Kant 
then says that the antinomy and its resolution afford indirect proof 
of the ideality of appearances, the Transcendental Aesthetic having 
38 39 given the direct proof." Beck adds that Kant wrote to Garve that 
the discovery of the antinomy was what originally led to the conclusion 
40 
that space and time were only forms of appearance. 
38L• W. Beck, ! Commentary .2!1. Kant's Critique of Practical Reason 
(University of Chicago, 1960), p. 186. 
39l1Sept. 21, 1798, xii, 257"0 
40L• W. Beck, editor, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason 
~ Other Writings in Moral Philosophy (University of Chicago, 1949), 
p. 203. This important observation of Kant's own statement that he 
arrived at his critical philosophy through the nature of antinomy should 
make us quite aware of the importance to understand properly ~ 
Antinomies, in order to understand properly Kant's Critical Philosophy. 
Beck, however, remarks in his Commentary ~ The Critique £f Practical 
Reason (p. 186 ff) that, because the proof of the antithesis presupposes 
the validity of Kantian phenomenalism, and the proof of the thesis is 
a typical rationalistic argument, the antinomy alone cannot be used 
as a premise for the phenomenality of nature, even though it may have 
suggested it to Kant. 
_ Weldon remarks that the antithesis must be considered justified 
~~ven though Kant has said both thesis and antithesis are fals~ but 
only in so far as the infinity is considered simply "the process of 
86 
The indirect proof of the ideality of appearances goes as follows. 
The world, as a whole existing iu itself as object, is neither finite 
nor infinite, i.e., both thesis and antithesis are false. Both are 
false because we have here a dialectical illusion, an illusion resting 
on the assumption that transcendental object is known (not that thing 
in itself is known. We are well beyond that point of the argument.) 
It is thus false that the world, the sum total of all appearances, is 
an absolutely whole totality existing in itself (as appearance in itself). 
Thus it follows that appearances in general are nothing outside our 
representations--this is just what is meant by their ideality.41 
Kant then emphasizes the fact that the critical solution of 
antinomies shows us that our idea of a totality of object is not at 
all knowledge of a total object; the critical solution shows us that 
the principle of reason is regulative, not constitutive.42 It is a rule, 
a regulative principle "postulating what we ought to do in the regress, 
but not anticipating what is present ~egebeE7 in the object as it is 
43 in itself prior to all regress. 
The ililiasion of reason is to take this regulative rule as a con-
atitutive cosmological principle by which we could ascribe full objective 
division can be carried on indefinitely, but that the possibility of the 
indefinite regress does not suppose the actual existence of an infinite 
number of independent reals, since the process itself deals with phenom-
ena not noumena". T. D. Weldon, Kant's Critique of Pure Beason (Oxford, 
1958), p. 207, emphasis supplied. 
4 1A506-7=B534-5 (448-49). 
43 A509=B537 (450). 
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reality (N. B., reality, not validity) to an idea that serves merely as 
a rule. Kant tells us that the proper meaning of this rule is that 
it does not tell us what an object is, i.e., it does not result in 
knowledge of an object. It tells us only how the empirical regress is 
to be carried out so as to arrive at the complete concept of an object, 
44 
even though it can never reach this goal. The total object, the 
total series of the empirically conditioned, as in itself either finite 
or infinite, cannot actually be given in experience. It is only in the 
idea, in the thinking the object, which cannot be given in experience, 
and thus the totality cannot be known. 
The first two antinomies are thus false in both the thesis and the 
antithesis because we no longer have a question of whether the series 
of conditions is in itself either finite or infinite, but only how we 
are to carry out the empirical regress and how far we are to continue 
it. 45 This patently concerns something far more subtle and profound 
than a mere distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. 
44Note that this does not contradict Kant's statements regarding 
degrees of objective reality (cf. our discussion in Chapter II, 
Section C of this thesis). We can quite legitimately interpret 
Kant's criticism of applying objective reality to a merely regulative 
idea in this discussion to mean that he is criticising the applying 
of objective reality of the first order (i.e. like that of the cate-
gories) to a regulative idea of speculative reason which has "objective 
reality" of a lesser kind (even though it is greater than that of a 
noumenon or of an ideal of pure reason whiohreallyhas no discernible 
"objective reality" for pure reason in its speculative employment). 
45A509-14=B537-42 (450-53). 
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Kant further reinforces our view of the nature of antinomy in 
Section 9 of ~ Antinomies. Kant discusses the empirical employment 
46 
of the regulative principle of reason. He begins by saying that it 
is in our considering an absolute totality ~ known Lrather than our 
consideration of transcendental object = iJ that we are involved in an 
improper employment of reason "in which reason demands this unconditioned 
completeness from what it assumes to be a thing in itself.,,47 The 
principle of pure reason is thus invalid as a"constitutive principle 
48 
of appearances in themselves." When we recognize that the principle 
of reason is a regulative idea rather than a constitutive one, i.e., 
that it does not yield knowledge of an object, and yet has subjective 
49 
significance and conformity ~ objects of possible experience, then 
the illusion is destroyed and reason is no longer at variance with it-
50 
self. 
Kant then goes on to say that even though we never experience an 
absolute limit of the series of appearances, we quite generally repre-
sent to ourselves 
••• the series of all past states of the world, as well 
as of all the things which co-exist in cosmic space, LWhic'i/ 
46A51 6=B544 (454). 47 A516 =B544 (454) emphasis supplied. 
48A51 6=B544 (454) emphasis supplied. Smith's translation readft 
"appearances Lviewed as thing..:t7 in themselves". 
49It is patent to us by now that the concept of noumenon could 
not have any critical conformity to objects of possible experience. 
is itself merely ~ possible empirical regress which 1 
think to myself, though in ~ indeterminate manner.51 
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The words which I have underlined in this statement make a workable 
basic definition of what Kant means by transcendental object = x. 
The upshot of this discussion is that we oannot, in the First 
Antinomy, say more than "that the r~gress in the series of appearances 
as a determination of the magnitude of the world proceeds .!!!.~_ 
52 
finitum." 
Kant goes on to point out that in the Second Antinomy the regress 
must be said to be in infinitum. This means simply that 
Vfuen, however, we have in mind the transcendental division 
of appearance in general, the question does not await an 
answer from experience; it is decided by a principle of 
reason which prescribes that, in the decomposition of 
the extended, the empirical regress, in conformity with 
the nature of this appearance, be never regarded as 
absolutely completed.?3 
Again Kant is consistent with the doctrine of transcendental object 
= x. It is never given as an absolutely complete whole, i.e., it 
remains unknown. But this is not to distin.§';uish it from appearance 
as a noumenon. This is to distinguish it from ~ appearances as 
they are met with in accomplished sense intuitions, and as these 
appearances are productive of knowledge of object. 
51 
A51=B54 (455). Emphasis supplied. 
c. The Dynamical Antinomies--Intellectual 
Object VB. Intelligible Object 
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Kant explains that the final two antinomies involve a dynamical 
synthesis and thus their object is essentially different from that in 
the mathematical antinomies; so very different, that in the final two 
antinomies both the thesis and the antithesis may be true. 54 
The dynamical antinomies admit a purely intelligible condition, 
i.e., a condition which is not a part of the series, whereas the 
mathematical antinomies admitted only a sensible condition. Thus we 
must now satisfy both reason, on the one hand, and understanding, on 
55 
the other. This was not the case in the first two antinomies where 
we had to satisfy only the understanding. 
In the case of natural causality our conflict would arise as it 
did in the mathematical antinomies if appearances ~ things-in-~-
selves. In such a case the conditions would always be members of the 
series as conditioned and the series would be too large or too small 
for the understanding. But then, when we considered the doctrine of 
transcendental object = x, the series of natural causality would be 
thought in its proper dimensions for understanding, and the illusory 
conflict of reason would disappear, in the order of nature. This 
would thus satisfy ~ understanding, but we must also satisfy reason 
which creates a pure transcendental idea of freedom (i.e. spontaneous 
causality), which borrows nothing from experience and which refers to 
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an object that cannot be determined or given in any experience. This 
is not a concern with the magnitude of the natural series, but it is 
rather a ~uestion of whether freedom can exist at all outside the 
total series of natural causality, and yet be compatible with that 
series. 
To confuse appearance L;nd the ground of its objective necessity, 
transcendental object = !l with thing-in-itself would destroy the very 
56 possibility of freedom. But, when we see that appearances are merely 
representations, we leave open the possibility of a free causality 
which would not contradict natural cause. This free causality would 
not contradict natural causality because it would lie entirely outside 
the possible total series of natural causes, and would neither be 
determined by appearances nor be the ground of the objective reality 
56 "For if appearances are things in themselves, freedom cannot be 
upheld. Nature will then be the complete and sufficient determining 
cause of every event ••• If, on the other hand, appearances are 
not taken fur more than they actually are; if they are not viewed as 
things in themselves, but merely as representations, connected according 
to empirigal laws, they must themselves have grounds which are not appear-
ances. {But such an intelligible gTound, in respect to its causality 
is not determined through appearances, even though its effects apfear, 
and so they can be determined through other appearances.:.7 While the 
effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions, the 
intelligible cause ••• My only purpose LEer!? has been to point out 
that ••• the inevitable consequence of obstinately insisting upon the 
reality of appearances is to destroy all freedom". A537-38=B56~-65 
(466-67). The sentence in brackets is my own translation of: "Eine 
solche intelligibele Ursache aber wird in Ansehung ihrer Kausalitat 
nicht durch Erscheinungen bestimmt, obzwar ihre Wirkungen erscheinen, 
und so durch andere Erscheinungen bestimmt werden konnen. (Werke, 
p. 491). Smith's translation here is correct, but we want to give 
greater emphasis to the fact that such an intelligible ground in respect 
to its causality is not at all determined. 
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of our concepts of appearances. This free cause is transcen~ and 
57 is radically other than the transcendental object = x. 
Kant's continuation of the discussion of possible harmony of free-
dom with natural necessity affords one of the most lucid illustrations 
of the importance of his authentic doctrine of transcendental object. 
It also illustrates the enormity of ramifications in a misunderstanding 
of this doctrine. 
At A538 .. B566 (467) Kant states that appearances, since they are 
not things-in-themselves, must rest upon a transcendental object which 
determines them as mere representations. Kant then says that there 
is nothing to prevent us from ascribing to this transcendental object, 
besides the quality in terms of which it aIlpears, a causality which is 
not appearance. This remark II not !:. skeptiCism on Kant's part regard-
58 
ing his doctrine of transcendental object • 
.Qa. lli contrary, when we read the passage at A538-43=B566-71 as 
a unit, we see that Kant immediately warns that to ascribe noumenal 
qualities to transcendental object is to "yield to the illusion of , trans-
- 59 
cendental realism, Lt hui} , neither nature nor freedom would remain." 
57A532-37=B561-65 (464-67). Contrast Graham Birdls discussion of 
this pas3age. QE. Cit., p. 195. 
58Kant's "skepticism" here is the same sort of "skepticism" we 
found in the Amphiboly at A288=B345 (293-4); cf. our discussion of N. 
K. Smith's Commentary, pp. 328 and 412 regarding A288=B345 and A402, 
B407 thru B411. Cf. also Caird, ~. cit., p. 581. 
59A543=B571 (470). 
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In so yielding to the illusion of transcendental realism and 
ascribing a causality which is not appearance to natural events, we 
would be ascribing a purely intelligible character to the object. 
This object would be a thing_~_itself.60 
This object, this thing-in-itself, is something thought by reason 
alone, and free from all influences of sensibility and all determina-
61 
tion ••• it is noumenon." 
But this thing must not be mistaken for transcendental object, 
i.e., the possible totality of regress in the synthesis of all appear-
ances in experience. If it were so mistaken, "Its causality, in so 
far as it Lalleges to bi/ intellectual, Vlould not at all stand within 
the series of empirical conditions, which L~ondition~ make the given 
62 
event necessary in the world of sense." 
N. K. Smith translates the phrase "so fern sie intellektuell ist" 
63 
to read "so far as it is intelligible". Smith adds the note that 
Kant's employment of the term "intellektuell" is misleading here; that 
Kant uses the less misleading term "intelligible" in all other cases. 
61 
A541=B569 (469). 
62This is my own translation of the text as it appears at Werke, 
p. 493 (A540=B568) I "Mit einem Worte, die Kausalitit desselben, sb 
fern sie intellektuell ist, stande gar nicht in der Reihe empirischer 
Bedingungen, welche die Begebenheit in der Sinnenwelt notwendig machen." 
Compare N. K. Smith's translation "In a word, its causality, so far 
as it is intelligible, would not have a place in the series of those 
empirical conditions through which the event is rendered necessary in 
the world of sense." (468). 
63 (468, note no. 3). 
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Smith's criticism of Kant here is particularly interesting in the 
light of his remarks elsewhere which are quite complimentary to the 
Refutation .2! Idealism, which also employs the term "intellektuell", 
as we point out below. Smith says: 
It represents a position peculiar to the maturer portions 
of the Analytic; the rest of the Critigue is not rewritten 
so as to harmonize with it, or to develop the consequences 
which consistent holding to it must involve. 64 
We feel that Kant is thoroughly consistent in his use of "intellektuell" 
here. We feel that "intellektuell" is consistent with the doctrinal 
maturity to which Smith refers. 
The fact is that Kant quite deliberately uses the term "intel-
lektuell" in the phrase "so fern sie intellektuell ist".65 He uses it 
here just as he does elsewhere when considering the proper meaning of 
transcendental object. We saw him employ this very same term at B423 
when he said "ist sie rein intellektuell,,66 in reference to the "I" 
in the proposition "I think". The very same employment of this term 
appears at B278 in the Refutation of Idealism. Kant states that the 
consciousness of myself in the representation 11111 is not an intuition, 
but rather a purely intellectual representation (lleine bloss intel-
64N• K. Smith, ~. £it., p. 272. 
65For Kant's own observations on the use of "intellektuell" as 
opposed to "intelligiblo" see the second foot note to §34 of the 
Prologomena, P. G. Lucas, translator (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press .,1953), p. 78. 
66 Werko, p. 356. 
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lektuelle Vorstellung ll • Werke, p. 251) of the spontaneity ("Selbst-
tatigkeH") of a thinking subject. 
Let us now return to the text at A540=B568. In yielding to the 
illusion of transcendental realism we would mistake the transcendental 
object as a thing-in-itself. This illusion would yield a purely intel-
ligible character, namely, a causality as totally and utterly removed 
from the series of empirical conditions. 
_ 61 
This Lin facil intelligible character can never, 
indeed, be immediately known, for nothing can be 
perceived except in so far as it appears. 68 It 
would have to be thought in accordance with the 
empirical character just as we are constrained to 
think ~ transcendental object ~ underlying appear-
ance s, though ~ .Q§!l know nothing of what it is i!!. 
itself.69 
It is patently impossible, in the light of Kant's larger context, to 
think a purely intelligible character in accordance with the empirical 
character, since the purely intelligible character is free ~ ~ 
influences of sensibility and all determination. A purely intellectual 
character, if properly employed, can be so thought since it is not 
totally free from all the influences of sensibility, but is limited, as 
61Si11ce Kant now employs the term "intelligibel" we understand 
him to mean lIin fact intelligible", not intellectual, as we were mis-
lead to believe. 
68Kant ,s text does not break into a new sentence here as Smith's 
translation does, but rather it inserts a comma followed by an "aber" 
which Smith does not translate. Cf. Werke, p. 493. The unity of 
thought sequence is important here. 
69 A540=B568 (468). I have supplied the underlining in the last 
two phrases for emphasis. 
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to its objective validity, by its application to the possible total 
synthesis of all the manifold of intuition in experience. 
It is, in fact, a law of the understanding that, without exception, 
all events are determined empirically in nature. It is "only in virtue 
of this law ••• Lthai? appearances constitute a nature and become 
objects of experience.,,70 
Reason falls into antinomy when it falls victim to the illusion 
that the regress of synthesis in intuition can be accomplished, and thus 
the unconditioned in the series can be known. This of course is impos-
sible. To fall victim to this illusion is to fall victim to the further 
illusion that appearances are things-in-themselves, i.e., illusion of 
transcendental realism. "Were we to yield to the illusion of transcen-
dental realism neither nature nor freedom would remain.,,7 1 
The only question Kant is concerned with here is whether freedom 
and natural necessity within the same acting subject contradict one 
another.72 
Only as we ascend from the empirical object to the 
transcendental should we find that this subject, together 
72Kant is not, for example, concerned with the question of whether 
or not the very causality the subject exercises in the natural order 
needs, to exist as a causality at all, a cause which is itself uncaused 
outside the natural order. Natural necessity in the world of experience 
is totally justified with the justification of the very possibility of 
any valid objective knowledge whatsoever. This objective necessity 
which the subject represents to himself rests ultimately, as we have 
seen, on the transcendental unity of apperception as objective, i.e., 
transcendental object = x. 
with all its causality in the field of appearance has in 
its noumenon73 certain conditions which must be regarded 
as purely intelligible.74 
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"Phaenomemon ll Vlould probably be the better reading here, since in our 
consideration of transcendental object we have not passed beyond 
IIphaenomenon ll into the realm of IInoumenon". Nevertheless, we recognize 
that something purely intelligible, something over and above the 
capability of pure speculative reason, is required to explain adequately 
~ freedom of which ~ ~ conscious. We recognize that freedom 
causes speculative reason to fall into insoluble conflict with itself 
it is considered to lie within the realm of appearances as grounded in 
transcendental object. We recognize also, that freedom beoomes an 
impossibility if these appearances are considered to be things-in-
themselves. 
IINoumenon" is a suitable reading here if it is understood to lie 
beyond the transcendental object as a merely possible entity for spec-
ulative reason. An entity with which speculative reason is in no way 
concerned. 
Kant makes this quite clear in The Critique of Practical Reason. 
Natural necessity belongs to "phaenomenon ll only, but the same subject 
is conscious of his existence as a thing-in-itself not standing under 
13Smith reads "noy-menon" here, for II phaenomenon ll , with Hartenstein. 
~ither reading is suitable if interpreted properly. See our discussion 
of this passage immediately following. 
14A545=B513 (411). 
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75 temporal conditions. He says, "I am justified in thinking of my 
existence as that of a noumenon in an intelligible world. 1I76 A short 
time later in the text Kant also says: 
Then it is clear th~t, if, its LYure reasonl~ 
capacity in the former Li.e. speculativ~ is not suf-
ficient to establish certain propositions positively, 
(which however do not contradict it), it must assume 
these propositions just as soon as they are sufficiently 
certified as belonging imFrescriptibly to the practical 
interest of pure reason.77 
The subject of speculative reason, quite validly considering him-
self as transcendental object, recognizes that he has some conditions 
which are purely intelligible. But rather than falling victim to the 
illusion that these conditions are included in the phenomenal order, or 
that he can make any valid objective considerations of them with pure 
reason in its speculative capacity, he must recognize that any consid-
eration of these purely intelligible conditions must be relegated to 
78 
the order of pure reason in its practical employment: 
Thus in our judgements in reGard to the causality of 
free actions, we can get as far as the intelligible cause, 
but not beyond it. We can know that it is free, that is, 
that it is determined independently of sensibility, and that 
in this way it may be the sensible unconditioned condition 
of appearances. But to explain why in the given circum-
stances the intelligible character should give just these 
appearances and this empirical character transcends all the 
powers of our reason, indeed all its rights of questioning, 
15Immanuel Kant, ~ Critique ££ Practical Reason and Other Writings 
.ill Moral fhilosophy, L. W. Beck, translator and editor (University of 
Chicago, 1949), p. 203. 
16 . ~., p. 218-19. 71~., p. 225. 
just ~ if. ~ ~ to ~ why lli transcendental ob,iect £!. 
~ outer sensible intuition gives intuition in space only 
and not some other mode of intuition.19 
---- --
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Thus, again we see, the antinomy rests on the illusion that reason 
can begin the series of conditions in the appearance by means of a 
sensible unconditioned. This illusion arises from an improper employ-
ment of the regulative idea of transcendental object as if it were 
constitutive, i.e., productive of knowledge, of a totality of objecto 
Such an employment would reC!uire either that the regress of synthesis 
in the saries of conditions be accomvlished, or that the first appear-
ance be known as unconditioned. The former is contradictory in itself; 
the latter violates the universal law of causality in nature, without 
which no experience of any object is possible. 
It is only when we recognize that free cause is completely beyond 
even the realm of a possible totality of experience (i.e. transcendental 
object = x) that we well recognize that free cause is entirely out of 
bounds for objective consideration by speculative reason precisely 
because it is purely intelligible. Thus we will be able to recognize 
80 
that "causality through freedom is at least ~ incompatible with nature." 
This recognition that it is free cause which lies in the noumenal 
sphere makes the allegation that Kant places the ground of natural 
19A551 =B585 (418). Underlining supplied for emphasis. 
necessity in the noumenal sphere totally inconsistent with Kant's 
81 
authentic doctrine. 
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In the fourth antinomy, it is not necessary that the condition in 
this dynamical regress should form a part of the series along with the 
conditioned: 
• • • this way of conce1v1ng how an unconditioned being 
may serve as the ground of appearance differs from that 
which we followed in the previous subsection, in deal-
ing with the empirically unconditioned cause of freedom. 
For there the thing itself was a cause (substantia phae-
nomenon) conceived to .' belong .i£. lli. series of condit- , 
ions ~ only ~ causali ty ~ thought ~ intelligible, • 
Here on the other hand the necessary being must be thought 
as entirely outside the series of the sensible world (as 
ens extramundanum), ~ ~ purely intelligible. 82 
The sensible world contains only appearancesl "In this field 
things-in-themselves are never objects to us. 1I83 
We mistake appearances for things-in-themselves if we leap beyond 
the context of sensibility. Kant says that we thus 
treat appearances as if they ~Iere things in themselves 
which exist apart from their transcendental ground, and 
which can remain standing while we seek an outside cause 
of their existence. • •• on the other hand, to think 
an intelligible ground of the appearances, that is of 
the sensible world, and to think it as free from the 
contingency of appearances, does not conflict either 
with the unlimited empirical regress in the series of 
81contrast Ewings allegation that Kant contends lithe real ground 
of the causal connection always belongs to the noumenal sphere and is 
for this very reason unknowable." A. C. Ewing, .2..E.. cit., p. 170. 
Cf. also pp. 102-3. 
82 A5 61=B589 (480-1) underlining supplied for emphasis. 
appearances nor with their thoroughgoing contingency. 
That indeed, is all that we had to do in order to re-
move the apparent antinomy.84 
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Thus we can understand Kant's proper meaning in the IIConcluding 
85 
Note on the whole Antinomy of Pure Reason". He says that as soon as 
we posit the unconditioned as entirely outside the sensible world, 
therefore outside ill possible experience, our ideas are no longer 
transcendental and cosmological, but they become purely transcendent. 86 
Their objective reality is not based on the completion of the empirical 
series but on pure a priori concepts. Such ideas have a purely intel-
ligible object. These objects may indeed ~ admitted to be transcenden-
87 
tal object, but there is not the least justification for doing so 
because, as such, transcendental object would be cut off from all 
empirical concepts. We would, therefore, be cut off from any reasons 
that would establish the possibility of such an object. It is in fact 
a purel;}r intelligible object, a thing-in-itself, a step beyond the sen-
sible world, which obliges us, since we are in a totally new area of 
84A563-64=B591-92 (482). Underlining supplied for emphasis. 
85A565-61=B593-95. 
861J1he full significance of our discussion of degrees of objective 
~eality (cf. Chapter II, Section C of this thesis) comes to light in 
I~his statement by Kant. The idea of transcendental object is a neces-
~ary and integral idea in the valid employment of pure reason in ita 
~peculative capacity. The idea of a thing-in-itself (noumenon), on the 
pther hand, finds a valid place only in the practical employment of 
pure reason. 
87 This is the same "skepticism" we have seen Kant employ elsewhere. 
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knowledge, i.e., knowledge of things in so far as they are purely 
intelligible, to begin an enquiry into the absolutely necessary being. 
This enquiry takes Kant into ~ Ideal £i Pure Reason, and beyond, 
into the realm of ~ Practical Reason--beyond the scope of this thesis. 
To summarize, in Chapter IV we have seen that the interpretation 
of transcendental object gleaned from the Analytic enabled us better 
to understand reason's natural conflict with itself. We have seen 
that Kant quite explicitly makes use of the doctrine of transcendental 
object in the Dialectic to make us so clearly aware of the nature of 
paralogism and antinomy that we can readily avoid the pitfalls which 
these dialectical self-conflicts of reason present to the non-critical 
understanding. Since, as Kant himself stated, the genesis of Kant's 
critical philosophy occurred in his realisation of the dialectical 
conflict of reason with itself, we have been able to increase our 
understanding of the nature of critical philosophy itself by means of 
the better understanding of the Dialectic. A proper interpretation 
of transcendental object helped us to accomplish this. Furthermore, 
our examination of the Dialectic strongly confirmed and reiterated in 
more explicit terms the interpretation of transcendental object which 
we had gleaned from the Analytic. 
We have seen (a) that Kant bases this illusion of paralogism on 
the improper application of the categories to a merely possible total 
regress in the synthesis of intuition of the self in inner sense. He 
mitigates the effectiveness of this illusion by pointing out that we 
never have an accomplished totality of intuition of the self, thus 
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that the self is not ever given as an object in intuition. Therefore, 
the categories cannot be applied to the "I" in any manner. It is also 
evident from his text that the categories cannot be applied to the 
unity of self since the transcendental unity of apperception is involved 
in the grounding of the categories themselveso 
We have seen (b) that Kant clearly distinguishes between the world 
as phenomenon and as noumenon as a preliminary measure to clarify the 
nature of the conflict in .TIl!. Antinomies. When we see that there is 
no question of the world being given as a thing-in-itself we clearly 
recognize that the conflict in ~ Antinomies is dialectical, not 
analytic or contradictory. Then, when we recognize that the world as 
a totality of phenomena is never actually given we clearly recognize 
that the world as a totality of phenomena (as the transcendental object 
= x) can never be known as .ither an infinite or as a finite object. 
A proper understanding of the role of transcendental object is essential 
for a proper understanding of Kant's resolution of the mathematical 
antinomies. 
We have seen (c) that Kant states that we satisfy the understanding 
in the resolution of the dynamical antinomies in the same way that we 
did in the mathematical antinomies. However, the dynamical antinomies 
are also concerned with a purely intelligible condition outside the 
otal series of phenomena. Therefore we must also satisfy the pure 
reason. Pure reason is satisfied when it learns that noumenal entities 
such as freedom or God are at least not demonstrablY incompatible with 
he series of phenomenal conditions in the world. However, a proper 
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treatment of such noumenal entities must be reserved to pure reason 
in ita practical employment. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen the evidence that argues that it is possible to 
interpret the doctrine of transcendental object univocally throughout 
both editions of the Critique. It can be interpreted not only as a 
critically mature doctrine, but also as a subtle and complex doctrine 
at the very heart of Kant's critical philosophy. 
We have seen (1) that transcendental object is a mature critical 
doctrine. It cannot be identified with thing-in-itself. Nor can it 
be considered as a merely subjective element in knowing. Nor can it 
be considered as simply a correlate of the subjectivity as it is encoun-
tered in the transcendental unity of apperception. 
We have seen (2) that Kant's text sustains an interpretation of 
transcendental object as a pregnant, though unknown, possible reality 
in the world of appearances. We validly represent it as an object to 
ourselves in an idea. 
We have seen (3) that transcendental object is a pure object, an 
nknown third something between the realm of things-in-themselves and 
ere appearances, that it is synthetically represented as a possible 
otality in the empirical synthesis of all appearances in one experience; 
hat its unknowability is due to the fact that its idea can never be 
pplied to an actually accomplished totality in the synthesis of appear-
nces. 105 
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Vfe have seen (4) that transcendental object is involved '7ith the 
world of a~pearances, not the realm of things-in-themselves (noumena), 
since it is a represented as a possible total synthesis of appearances. 
We have seen (5) that transcendental object is intimately bound 
up with the transcendental unity of apperception in that it makes 
that transcendental unity a necessary, thus fully objective unity; 
that it is thus the ultimate ground of the objectivity of all objects 
in experience, the ultimate ground of the valid employment of the 
categories as that employment is justified in the Transcendental ~­
uction--it is, in short, the ~ qua ~ of the very possibility of 
objects in experience. 
We have seen (6) that the transcendental object, so interpreted, 
plays a meaningful and truly critical role in the proper solution of 
pure reason's dialectical conflict with itself when its unknowability 
as a possible totality in the series of appearances is properly kept 
in view. Without such an interpretation a proper understanding of the 
critical problem manifested by the antinomies is impossible. 
We feel that this interpretation is not merely helpful in avoiding 
false accusations against Kant as an inconsistent and at times, highly 
uncritical philosopher in his 'Critique .2.!. ~ Reason, but also opens 
up a new possibility to better appreciate the rigorous, critical, and 
demanding philosophical system of Immanuel Kant. 
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